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Sharia. Religion scholars may dispute the precise meaning of the
term, but it invariably provokes immediate and conflicting reactions
among the American public. To believers, it is a series of sacred
precepts ordained by God to help foster a holy life. To critics, it is an
oppressive and theocratic menace that must be stopped at all costs.
But whatever the meaning or merits of sharia as a religious matter, the
festering controversy over its present consideration by domestic courts
is not, at bottom, a religious dispute. Rather, it is a struggle over the
extent to which Muslims, like people of other faiths in this country,
should be free to tailor their personal or business affairs according to
deeply-held beliefs about who they are and where they are going—
even, and especially, where those beliefs are controversial or
unpopular. It is about religious liberty.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The particulars of sharia are somewhat amorphous, and can vary
by sect, nationality, or believer. Sharia may nonetheless be described
generally as a “moral, religious, ethical, and legal system based on
Islam’s two primary sources: the Holy Qu’ran, which Muslims believe
to be the literal word of God, and the Sunnah, the teachings and
practices of Prophet Mohammad.”1 In addition to the Koran and
Prophet, Muslims also draw upon the wisdom of Islamic scholars and
a form of religious common law based on analogies to Koranic
principles.2 As one would expect, sharia concerns religious worship
and ritual.3 It can extend further, however, to also address more
secular matters like domestic relations, wills and estate planning,
business transactions, and, perhaps most controversially, crime and
punishment.4
American courts do not, and could not, apply the criminal-law
provisions of sharia.5 They do, however, consider sharia in civil
disputes—at least indirectly. Courts, for example, enforce contract
terms requiring certain disputes be resolved through sharia-based
arbitration.6 They also address sharia in domestic-relations cases,
including those arising from relationships among Muslims in this
country as well as those begun, and perhaps previously adjudged,
overseas (i.e., in Muslim countries).7 And courts defer to Muslim
officials when reviewing clerical or other intra-faith disputes.8 In the
* Director, Stanford Law School Religious Liberty Clinic. The author thanks Paul
Harold, Jared Haynie, Marie Killmond, Michael McConnell, Stefan McDaniel, Eric
Rassbach, Daniel Renz, Rachael Samberg, Shirin Sinnar, Mary Sonne, and Asma
Uddin for their invaluable input and assistance.
1
Muhammad Elsayed, Comment, Contracting Into Religious Law: Anti-Sharia
Enactments and the Establishment and Free-Exercise Clauses, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 937, 939
(2013).
2
Frank Griffel, Introduction to SHARI’A: ISLAMIC LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY
CONTEXT 1, 3 (Abbas Amanat & Frank Griffel eds., 2007).
3
MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI’A LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 41 (2008).
4
See id. at 41–42.
5
See Jeremy Grunert, Note, How Do You Solve a Problem Like Sharia? Awad v. Ziriax
and the Question of Sharia Law in America, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 695, 725–26 (2013)
(describing statutory and constitutional limitations on the domestic application of any
sharia-based criminal-law provisions).
6
See, e.g., Abd Alla v. Mourssi, 680 N.W.2d 569, 574 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004)
(affirming Islamic arbitration); Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404, 413–14 (Tex. App.
2003) (same).
7
See, e.g., S.B. v. W.A., 959 N.Y.S.2d 802, 819 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) (upholding
sharia-based premarital agreement); Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988, 1010–11 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1996) (enforcing a Pakistani child-custody order).
8
See, e.g., El-Farra v. Sayyed, 226 S.W.3d 792, 796 (Ark. 2006) (relying on
“ministerial exception” in refusing to hear imam’s claims against his former mosque
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end, the results in these cases might differ from what civil law would
otherwise require. For example, courts might impose monetary
penalties in a no-fault divorce,9 block the sale of freely owned
property,10 allow a faith-based result in arbitration,11 or grant relief
from an arms-length business transaction.12
Because of its treatment of areas regulated by temporal authority,
conflicts between sharia and domestic secular law are inevitable. But
should that justify the hostility sharia has received in the dozens of
states where laws targeting its domestic use have been proposed or
enacted in recent years? After all, judges in a common-law system like
ours frequently draw from external sources of authority where the
litigants have agreed they should do so, or where such references are
required by comity—i.e., reciprocal respect for another jurisdiction’s
law or decisions. Plus, applications of any such “foreign” law are
subject to the crucial exception that no external laws should be applied
if the public policy of the applying jurisdiction would suffer—e.g., it
would violate a fundamental civil right.13 And regarding religious law,
domestic courts already must strike a balance in accordance with longstanding constitutional norms: religious practices are to be honored
and respected, but they should neither be imposed by, nor become
unduly entangled with, the state.14 Determining applicable law can be
tricky, and judges do not always get it right. But sharia is not unique
in this regard.

employer).
9
See Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002)
(upholding sharia-based contract imposing monetary penalty on husband in divorce
proceeding).
10
See Elsayed, supra note 1, at 940–41 (describing sharia-based right of first refusal
of cotenant).
11
See Abd Alla, 680 N.W.2d at 573 (enforcing Islamic arbitration award under state
contract law).
12
See Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co., Inc., 866 A.2d
1, 30–35 (Del. 2005) (upholding damage award for “usurpation” in business
transaction under Saudi law).
13
See Eugene Volokh, Religious Law (Especially Islamic Law) in American Courts, 66
OKLA. L. REV. 431, 435–41 (2014) (describing public-policy limits on the application
of foreign law); see also generally Asifa Quraishi-Landes, Rumors of the Sharia Threat Are
Greatly Exaggerated: What American Judges Really Do With Islamic Family Law in Their
Courtrooms, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 245, 249–51 (2012) (same).
14
See MARK E. HANSHAW, MUSLIM AND AMERICAN? STRADDLING ISLAMIC LAW AND U.S.
JUSTICE 191–92 (2010) (describing First Amendment prohibitions on the imposition
of religious arbitration on the unwilling); Asma T. Uddin & Dave Pantzer, A First
Amendment Analysis of Anti-Sharia Initiatives, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363, 383–84 (2012)
(describing First Amendment contemplating “individual ordering . . . according to
one’s own religious beliefs”).
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Within this framework, application of, or deference to, foreign
authority has regularly included faith-based sources. Secular courts,
for example, enforce Beth Din contracts between observant Jews
requiring resolution of their disputes before rabbinical tribunals;15
“covenant” (i.e., limited divorce) marriage contracts between
Evangelical Christians are increasingly recognized;16 and the right of
Amish parents to raise children according to the laws of their faith has
been endorsed by no less authority than the United States Supreme
Court.17 The corporate decisions of each of these faiths are also
broadly protected by the “ministerial exception” recently blessed by
the Court in the Hosanna-Tabor case.18 But none of these other
religions attract the antipathy faced by Muslims hoping to follow
sharia. As Professor Feldman has put it, “[n]o legal system has ever
had worse press.”19
The reasons for hostility are perhaps no mystery. Anti-Islamic
sentiment has increased in frequency and intensity since September
2001, and continued unrest in the Middle East has deepened religious
mistrust.20 Coincidentally, controversy arising from the Supreme
Court’s recent references to foreign law in applying the federal
constitution—a distinct matter of domestic law often confused with the
direct imposition of another country’s law—has not cooled associated
nationalist impulses.21
But whatever the origins or merits of popular opposition to Islam
(or foreign law generally), targeting sharia consideration in domestic
courts undercuts religious liberty and is inconsistent with our standard
approach to foreign law. As with these other sources, religious or
15

See generally Michael J. Broyde, Jewish Law Courts in America: Lessons Offered to
Sharia Courts by the Beth Din of America Precedent, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 287 (2012)
(describing history and broader significance of the recognition of Jewish law courts by
domestic courts).
16
Covenant marriage laws have been passed in Arkansas, Arizona, and Louisiana.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-901 (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-801 (2002); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:272 (2000).
17
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972).
18
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012) (protecting the right of religious organizations to determine their religious
missions; there, the right to select ministers).
19
Noah Feldman, Why Shariah?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at MM46.
20
See Yaser Ali, Comment, Shariah and Citizenship—How Islamophobia Is Creating a
Second-Class Citizenry in America, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1042–49 (2012) (describing
sharia-based Islamophobia in post-9/11 context).
21
See generally Eugene Volokh, Foreign Law in American Courts, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 219
(2014) (describing controversy over the Supreme Court’s recent invocations of foreign
law in interpreting constitutional provisions, and the resulting confusion in adoption
of anti-sharia measures).
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otherwise, the domestic court’s encounter with sharia does not
constitute an application of Islamic or other foreign law in its own
right, but the consideration of outside authority based on rules of
decision that apply—and within due and neutral limits—under
established conflicts-of-law doctrine.22
Singling out sharia for
disfavored treatment, even (and perhaps particularly) where it plays
no different role than any other foreign legal source, stigmatizes the
Muslim community and clashes with our constitutional tradition.23
Practices central to many faiths are at risk if, as some states have
declared recently, courts are not only prohibited from considering
sharia but cannot apply legal rules or enforce judgments from “any
system” with different constitutional norms.24 Under these regimes, a
court could reject an otherwise valid choice-of-law or arbitration term
in a contract, a property sale, or a family arrangement because of its
religious origins.25 More broadly, even where “anti-sharia” laws may
have little practical effect—e.g., in the states that profess, in supposed
contrast to Islam, that courts must act legally26—the message is
worrisome and contrary to the robust religious pluralism to which our
nation has historically aspired.
To this point, the bulk of the literature addressing the domestic
application of sharia has taken one of two opposing forms—both of
which, purposefully or not, also tend to take a view of sharia on the
merits and thus confuse the important distinction between religion
and religious liberty. On one side, those who oppose the use of sharia
in domestic law invariably do so because, they argue, it violates human

22

See Volokh, supra note 13, at 431 (“But in many of the instances that critics see
as improper ‘creeping Sharia,’ it is longstanding American law that calls for recognizing
or implementing an individual’s religious principles, including Islamic principles.”
(emphasis added)).
23
See Robert K. Vischer, The Dangers of Anti-Sharia Laws, 221 FIRST THINGS 26
(2012) (describing the resulting stigmatization of Islam by domestic anti-sharia
measures).
24
E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5103 (2013) (preventing application of foreign law
where “system” from which it comes fails to accord the same fundamental rights as are
available under the state or federal constitutions); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 20 (2013)
(providing similarly); cf. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-8-7 (2012) (prohibiting the
enforcement of “any religious code”).
25
See Matthew Schmitz, Fears of ‘Creeping Sharia’, NAT’L REV. (June 13, 2012),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/302280/fears-creeping-sharia-matthewschmitz (describing the broad religious liberty implications of Kansas’s anti-foreign
law statute).
26
E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:6001 (2010) (preventing application of “foreign
law” if doing so would “result in a violation of a right guaranteed” by the Louisiana or
United States Constitution).
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dignity and freedom.27 On the other side, those who support applying
sharia (at least as it has been applied domestically) commonly
emphasize aspects that would be widely accepted and minimize its
more controversial invocations.28
This Article proposes a third path, based on religious-liberty
principles: regardless whether sharia is good, bad, or indifferent, our
courts (and political culture) should approach it no differently than
any other foreign source of law. In so arguing, it proceeds in six parts:
(I) this introduction; (II) a summary of approaches courts take when
faced with external authority; (III) an overview of how Muslims
typically try to follow sharia domestically; (IV) a discussion of the
relevant “anti-sharia” trend (including its practical and legal aspects);
(V) an exploration of some broader religious-liberty implications of
the “anti-sharia” movement; and (VI) a brief conclusion. At bottom,
this Article seeks to provide a theoretical framework to resolve the
controversy in a manner consistent with “the best of our traditions.”29
One of the most rewarding aspects of our launching at Stanford
Law School the nation’s only full-time law-school clinic dedicated to
religious liberty has been teaching students how to reflect upon and
articulate to an often-skeptical audience that our clients’ claims are not
about faith or politics, but freedom. That freedom is not absolute, but
nor should it be restricted simply because its exercise is controversial,
unpopular, or maybe even inconsistent with freedom itself. After all,
religious-liberty protections would be unnecessary were the practice at
issue widely accepted and consistent with the dominant cultural or
political ethos. And so it is for Muslim Americans seeking to live in
accordance with sharia.
27

E.g., CTR. FOR SEC. POLICY, SHARIA LAW AND AMERICAN STATE COURTS (2011),
available at http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/
Shariah_in_American_Courts1.pdf (assembling cases applying sharia, which authors
describe as threat to liberty and equality); Karen Lugo, American Family Law and ShariaCompliant Marriages, 13 ENGAGE 65, 66–68 (2012) (citing oppressive practices in
questioning domestic application of sharia); Bradford J. Kelley, Bad Moon Rising: The
Sharia Law Bans, 73 LA. L. REV. 601, 609–12 (2013) (rejecting application of sharia law
in domestic courts, based in large part on unjust results).
28
See, e.g., Cyra Akila Choudhury, Shari’ah as National Security Threat?, 46 AKRON L.
REV. 49, 83–99 (2013) (describing Islamophobia of “anti-sharia” campaign); Abed
Awad, The True Story of Sharia in American Courts, THE NATION (June 13, 2012)
(minimizing controversial sharia-based practices); Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at
251–54 (describing pro-woman aspects of sharia); WAJAHAT ALI & MATTHEW DUSS,
Understanding Sharia Law, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 3 (Mar. 2011), https://cdn.
americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/03/pdf/sharia_law.pdf
(arguing that claims against the domestic application of sharia ignore how sharia is
actually practiced).
29
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
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II. CONFLICTS, COMITY, AND RELIGION
Before exploring the domestic application of sharia, it is
important first to review the basic parameters of the two legal contexts
in which the issue arises: conflict-of-laws and the so-called “religious
question” doctrine. Conflict-of-laws, or conflicts, is a set of rules courts
use in deciding what substantive law to apply where a case involves facts
or circumstances arising outside the place where suit is brought.30
Among the options are for the court to apply the laws of the place
where it sits (despite the case’s foreign aspects), those of another
jurisdiction, or those chosen by the parties or otherwise seemingly
required by the action—which, for our purposes, might include faithbased concepts.31 Use of religious authority, however, is regulated
further by the religious-question doctrine. That doctrine, which is
driven by First Amendment concerns, generally requires courts to
refrain from resolving doctrinal or other religious questions outside
the courts’ competence that should be resolved, if at all, by religious
authorities.32
As one would expect, where a secular dispute arises entirely within
the geographic area in which suit is brought and the parties have not
sought to agree otherwise, the court applies the secular law of that
place.33 Of course, not all domestic relationships, accidents, or
contracts are so parochial. A couple might marry in one state, raise
children in another, and separate in yet another still. A tort lawsuit
might involve a product made, sold, or used in different states. And
modern business contracts often involve interstate or international
matters.
Courts must therefore have a process for deciding what “foreign”
law should govern—i.e., law other than that which it uses for intrajurisdictional disputes. That process, whether adopted by statute or
judges themselves, is the courts’ conflicts rules.34 And because the
resulting use of foreign law depends entirely upon such conflicts rules,
the law applied to the case at hand is ultimately not the creature of any
other place, but is in fact the enforcement of local law—in its entirety.35
30

CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (Peter Hay et al., eds., 2010).
Id. at 144 (describing courts’ conflicts options).
32
See Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 493, 494 (2013)
(describing general parameters of First Amendment limitations on court adjudication
of religious disputes).
33
CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 371 (John J. Cound et al., eds., 2001).
34
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) (describing
conflicts rules).
35
See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that
the application of a state’s laws necessarily includes that state’s choice of law for a given
31
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In other words, the application of foreign law results not from the
authority of that law in its own right but from the local forum’s conflicts
rule for deciding the case before the court. In this sense, it is domestic
law.
Conflicts doctrine varies by jurisdiction, and the subject is not free
from its own controversies.36 Typically, however, American courts
apply law to cases before them as follows: (1) local law, if the dispute
and parties are from there; or (2) the law of another state or country,
if (a) the dispute arises (or was already ruled upon) there, (b) one or
more parties is from there, or (c) the dispute is otherwise connected
in a significant way to that other place.37 Alternatively, all jurisdictions
recognize the right of parties, as a matter of personal autonomy and
freedom of contract, to “opt out” of a forum’s laws, including its
conflicts rules, and agree that other laws—including, perhaps, faithbased ones—will govern.38
Pertinently, religious norms often serve as the source of law in a
conflicts scenario—whether directly (through privately chosen
religious doctrine or faith-based dispute-resolution methods) or
indirectly (through privately chosen foreign laws arising from
countries with an established religion, or comity for the laws or preexisting judgments entered in such countries).39 Common direct
examples include disputes arising from marriages formed under
religious auspices,40 wills drafted in accordance with the decedents’
faith,41 or agreements to arbitrate using religious norms or referring

dispute).
36
See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional
Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1968 (1997) (observing that “nothing in
conflicts law is ever neat or tidy”).
37
See Thomas J. Tallarico & Patrick M. McCarthy, Conflict of Laws, 44 WAYNE L.
REV. 597, 599–601 (1998) (describing typical conflict of laws approaches).
38
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). As a leading
treatise notes, the Restatement’s private “choice of law” rule is “followed by more
American courts than any other provision of the Restatement.” CONFLICT OF LAWS,
supra note 30, at 1088 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Larry E. Ribstein,
From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363, 367 (2003)
(noting private-law clauses “are enforced in all but certain narrow categories”).
39
See Elsayed, supra note 1, at 945–48 (describing foreign and religious law in
American courts).
40
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. 1990) (upholding
pre-nuptial agreement binding couple to Orthodox Jewish principles in the event of
divorce).
41
See, e.g., K. Eli Akhavan, Basic Principles of Estate Planning Within the Context of
Jewish Law, PROBATE & PROP. 60, 60–63 (July/Aug. 2011) (describing Jewish estate
planning).
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disputes to a panel of fellow believers.42 Less direct examples include
disputes over marital or child-custody arrangements that were already
ruled on in some way by a court in a country with an established
religion, or contracts to resolve disputes under the laws of such a
country.43
No matter the conflicts method or source of law chosen, however,
every jurisdiction in the United States also retains a “public policy
exception.”44 Justice Cardozo famously described this exception as
precluding application of foreign law that “would violate some
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of
morals, [or] some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.”45 The
exception has been defined alternatively as applying where the foreign
law “is not only different from but also offensive to generally accepted
values within the [applying] forum.”46 Examples of public-policy
limitations include refusals to recognize tort claims among spouses,47
gambling-based claims,48 covenants-not-to-compete,49 and the validity
Courts also will not enforce another
of certain marriages.50
jurisdiction’s criminal laws, whether rooted in religion or otherwise.51
The mere presence of a conflict will not suffice to refuse the
application of foreign law on public-policy grounds; naturally, a certain
level of difference is presumed whenever a court is confronted with the
question of what law it should use. Rather, the public-policy exception
42

Helfand, supra note 32, at 506–08 (describing growth in faith-based
arbitration).
43
See, e.g., Nat’l Grp. for Commc’ns., Ltd. & Computers v. Lucent Techs. Int’l, 331
F.Supp. 2d 290, 292 (D.N.J. 2004) (applying Saudi sharia-based law in commercial
dispute).
44
Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 321 (Tex. 1979) (observing that the publicpolicy exception is common to all jurisdictions).
45
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111 (1918).
46
John Bernard Corr, Modern Choice of Law and Public Policy: The Emperor Has the
Same Old Clothes, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 647, 649 (1985).
47
See, e.g., Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 473–74 (1936) (refusing on New York
public-policy grounds to recognize inter-spousal tort claim arising from out-of-state
accident).
48
See, e.g., Lane & Pyron, Inc. v. Gibbs, 266 Cal. App. 2d 61, 68 (1968) (upholding
on California public-policy grounds trial court’s rejection of gambling-based claim
arising out of state).
49
See, e.g., Application Grp. v. Hunter Grp., 61 Cal. App. 4th 881, 901 (1998)
(refusing on California public-policy grounds to enforce out-of-state covenant not to
compete).
50
See, e.g., Hesington v. Estate of Hesington, 640 S.W. 2d 824, 826–27 (Mo. 1982)
(refusing to recognize common-law marriage arising out of state based on Missouri
public policy).
51
See CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 173–74 (on non-enforcement of foreign
criminal law).
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applies where fundamental or substantial public interests are
implicated.52 For example, the policy “may be embodied in a statute
which makes one or more kinds of contracts illegal or which is
designed to protect a person against the oppressive use of superior
bargaining power.”53 Therefore, courts refuse to enforce foreign-law
arrangements that violate equal protection on the basis of gender, due
process, or other important civil rights.54 Pertinently, they likewise
would not impose religious law on those who never chose it.55
Although not classified as public policy, the religious-question
doctrine imposes additional parameters on the application of foreign
law where religion is involved.56 These arise chiefly from constitutional
concerns. To that end, the First Amendment prohibits courts from
deciding the “truth or falsity” of religious beliefs, or resolving
“controversies over religious doctrine and practice.”57 As the Supreme
Court has observed, “religious controversies are not the proper subject
of civil court inquiry.”58 Moreover, and as the Court clarified recently,
the First Amendment includes within this deferential approach broad
protection from—or, in the words of Chief Justice Roberts, “special
solicitude” against—governmental interference with decisions of
church governance and the selection of ministers.59
Provided they avoid doctrinal questions or matters on which they
must defer to religious authorities, however, courts commonly face
cases with religious ingredients.60 Again, courts might determine the
52

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) & cmt. g (1971).
Id.
54
See, e.g., Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 500–01 (Md. 2008) (refusing to
recognize husband’s disproportionate divorce rights under Islamic law based on
gender-inequality statute); Tarikonda v. Pinjari, No. 287403, 2009 WL 930007, at *2
(Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009) (refusing to recognize talaq divorce on due-process
grounds).
55
Sarah M. Fallon, Note, Justice for All: American Muslims, Sharia Law, and
Maintaining Comity Within American Jurisprudence, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 153, 180
(2013) (“The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause
protect against the application of religious law to a party who has not agreed to such
application.”).
56
See generally Helfand, supra note 32 (discussing and critiquing the so-called
“religious question doctrine,” which limits secular courts’ ability to examine religious
questions).
57
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944); accord Presbyterian Church v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
58
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese U.S.A. & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 713 (1976).
59
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 692,
706 (2012).
60
See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 714 (1871) (“Religious organizations
come before us in the same attitude as other voluntary associations for benevolent or
53
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validity of faith-based marriages, enforce contracts arising from such
marriages, or interpret estate plans written according to religious
And although the litigants’ faith may frame such
norms.61
controversies and provide the final answer, any court consideration of
religion is shunted in the first instance through civil marriage,
contract, and estate law, not religious doctrine.62 Courts might
consider faith-based concepts to determine the nature of a
relationship—for example, whether a couple had in fact agreed to a
prenuptial contract or what the terms of a testator’s will are—and
perhaps even be called upon to resolve the question on conflicting
evidence.63 Any consideration of religious matters like this, however,
results not from religion but from secular conflicts rules—including
their public-policy and constitutional limitations.64
Whether in the personal or business context, courts also assess
faith-based arbitration using largely the same standards as the
arbitration of secular disputes.65 As long as the parties consented, the
arbitration terms are clear, the arbitrator does not abuse her authority
or allow the process to be tainted, and public policy is not offended,
the agreement to arbitrate and any resulting orders will be enforced.66
charitable purposes, and their rights of property, or of contract, are equally under the
protection of the law, and the actions of their members subject to its restraints.”); Ann
Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in American Family Law, 63 MD. L. REV. 540,
547–48 (2004) (describing religious neutrality).
61
See generally Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13 (describing domestic courts’
treatment of Islamic family law matters); Omar T. Mohammedi, Sharia-Compliant Wills:
Principles, Recognition, and Enforcement, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 259 (2012) (describing
treatment of sharia-compliant wills).
62
See Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 249–51 (observing that domestic
recognition of sharia-based marital arrangements is rooted in secular “freedom of
contract”); Mohammedi, supra note 61, at 260 (emphasizing “freedom of contract” in
ensuring viability of sharia-based wills).
63
See Elsayed, supra note 1, at 953–54 (describing courts’ occasional need to review
evidence on religious teachings where faith-based contracts are unclear).
64
Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 251 (“[J]udges neither react with an
automatic rejection of Sharia, nor do they give it wholesale deference without
considering public policy and general constitutional principles.”); see also Volokh,
supra note 13, at 431 (same).
65
See Helfand, supra note 32, at 506–08 (describing approach of courts to religious
arbitration as substantially similar to non-religious arbitration); see also generally
Michael C. Grossman, Note, Is This Arbitration?: Religious Tribunals, Judicial Review, and
Due Process, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 169 (2007) (criticizing courts’ equal treatment of
religious arbitration).
66
Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating
Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1243–44 (2001) (observing that “[t]he
mechanism to have a claim arbitrated by a religious arbitration court is the same as it
is for standard arbitration courts” and that “[a]wards issued by religious arbitration
courts, like those of standard arbitration tribunals, are subject to the [limited]
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Likewise, courts enforce foreign judgments and private choices of law
involving faith-based rules—often under the laws of another country—
provided they do not involve controversies over religious doctrine.67
Finally, most courts try to resolve religious-property disputes under
“neutral principles of law” (i.e., through secular sources like deeds or
charters).68 And even where neutral principles are not used, courts try
to defer to relevant religious authorities rather than impose their own
views.69
In sum, American courts have an established system for applying
foreign law, including religious law. They might not always reach the
correct results, but any analysis of sharia applications must account for
these common approaches.
III. SHARIA AND ITS DOMESTIC APPLICATIONS
Against the backdrop of conflicts rules and First Amendment
limitations, and as described below, the application of sharia by
domestic courts is a fairly standard legal enterprise. This is not to
suggest sharia’s critics—which, it should be noted in this context, can
include Muslims who disagree among themselves on how others of
their faith might understand or practice it—have no basis for concern
over the use of Islamic law generally. They may, they may not. But
when it comes to its application by domestic courts in this country,
singling out sharia for facially disfavored treatment is not justified.
Rather than ensuring “American law for American courts,” the recent
pursuit of “anti-sharia” laws undercuts our standard approach to such
matters. As Professor Quraishi-Landes observes, “judicial treatment of
Sharia requests is not threatening the American rule of law, it is an
illustration of it.”70
A brief review of sharia generally and three areas of law where it
is most commonly applied reveal the largely unremarkable nature of
the supposed problem and the unnecessary harm—both to the
budding American Muslim community and to religious liberty
generally—caused by recent “anti-sharia” efforts in many states. These
three areas are (1) domestic relations; (2) estate practices; and (3)
statutory grounds for vacatur”).
67
See Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 246–47 (describing court approaches to
religious law).
68
See Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Texas, 422 S.W.3d 594, 607 n.6 (Tex. 2013)
(describing “neutral principles” approach in religious land-use cases and citing cases
from majority of states where it has been adopted).
69
See id. at 602 (describing minority approach of deference to church hierarchy
in property cases).
70
Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 246–47.
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alternative dispute resolution. (Again, recall that domestic courts do
not apply the sharia-based criminal-law provisions that are the most
controversial of all.)71
A. Sharia Generally
Sharia, or “the path to the watering place” in Arabic, is for
believers a set of “commands, prohibitions, guidance and principles
that God has addressed to mankind pertaining to their conduct in this
world and salvation in the next.”72 As an integrated system for both
secular and religious behavior, sharia “designate[s] the rules and
regulations that govern the lives of Muslims.”73 More than a mere legal
code, sharia is designed “to facilitate the ability of Muslims to know
how to conform their lives with the Will of Allah.”74
Sharia’s particulars are generally based on four sources: (1) the
Koran’s text; (2) reports (“hadith”) about the sayings and life
(“sunna”) of the Prophet Mohammed; (3) the consensus of Islamic
scholars (“ijma”); and (4) analogies to teachings from the Koran or
Prophet (“qiyas”) where new situations occur.75 As one would expect,
not all Muslims subscribe to a uniform interpretation, analysis, or
application of these four sources (collectively referred to as “fiqh”);
indeed, sharia interpretations are diverse and dynamic.76 That said,
American Muslims commonly turn to sharia, in whatever form or
understanding, as a source of divine guidance in their lives—
particularly where marriage and family are concerned.77
In secular countries like the United States, sharia applies only to
the extent particular believers seek to follow it in their own affairs.78
71

See CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 173–74.
KAMALI, supra note 3, at 14.
73
GRIFFEL, supra note 2, at 3.
74
RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (SHARI’A) xiii (2011).
75
Id.
76
See id. at 3–4; see also Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 251–54 (describing
intra-Muslim diversity of views about the nature and content of sharia).
77
See Maha Alkhateeb, Islamic Marriage Contracts: A Resource Guide for Legal
Professionals, Advocates, Imams & Communities 18, PEACEFUL FAMILIES PROJECT (2012),
http://www.bwjp.org/files/bwjp/articles/Islamic_Marriage_Contracts_Resource_Gu
ide_APIIDV_2012.pdf (describing common adherence to sharia in marriages among
Muslims); see also Ali, supra note 20, at 1064 (observing “most” Muslims “would proudly
refer to themselves as Shariah adherents,” albeit in varying degrees); Mohammedi,
supra note 61, at 262 (noting “devout Muslims are expected” to follow sharia
inheritance rules).
78
BHALA, supra note 74, at xxxi; see also Elsayed, supra note 1, at 961 (“[T]he reality
is that Sharia law is only as relevant to a case as the parties to a contract make it—they
must contract into Sharia (or any other religious law) for it to have any import in a
case.”).
72

SONNE(DO NOT DELETE)

730

6/22/2015 5:03 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:717

And once again, and as in other long-established and diverse religious
traditions, “Shari’a today means different things to different
Muslims.”79 In any event, however, where a Muslim believer considers
it to apply, sharia is a sacred set of principles central to that individual’s
public and private affairs in service and obedience to God—no matter
the society or country in which they live.80 It is central to who they are
as human beings.
B. Marriage and Family
Like most religions, Muslims look to sharia for detailed rules on
marriage and family; indeed, the family is rightly described as “the
heart” of sharia.81 And in regulating the domestic affairs of Muslims,
sharia may foster arrangements that are unequal between men and
women, or otherwise at odds with typical family relationships in the
United States.82 Nonetheless, when domestic courts address familyrelated disputes among American Muslims, they do not apply sharia in
its own right but only, if at all, through state law in the first instance.83
In marriage formation, for example, sharia might prohibit a
Muslim from marrying someone who does not believe in God.84 And
while a Muslim man may marry a “woman of the Book” (i.e., Jew or
Christian), a Muslim woman may marry only a Muslim man.85 Sharia
can also provide disparate age minimums, the negotiation of marriage
by one’s relatives, and in some cases allow polygamy.86 But questions
79

GRIFFEL, supra note 2, at 12.
JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 4 (1982) (observing that
sharia “is, in the last resort, the sum total of the personal privileges and duties of all
individuals”); see also Mark L. Movsesian, Fiqh and Canons: Reflections on Islamic and
Christian Jurisprudence, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 861, 864 (2011) (describing importance
of religious law to contemporary Muslims).
81
Lugo, supra note 27, at 66.
82
Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 247–51 (describing sharia marriage and
divorce rules).
83
Estin, supra note 60, at 551 (observing that in the United States, “persons of all
religious, cultural and ethnic backgrounds are subject to the same family law rules and
institutions”).
84
See Alex B. Leeman, Note, Interfaith Marriage in Islam: An Examination of the Legal
Theory Behind the Traditional and Reformist Positions, 84 IND. L.J. 743, 755 (2009)
(describing religious-entry rules under traditional sharia).
85
See id. at 755–58.
86
See Yehiel S. Kaplan, A Father’s Consent to the Marriage of His Minor Daughter:
Feminism and Multiculturalism in Jewish Law, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 393, 400
(2009) (describing marital-age rules in Muslim context); Lindsey E. Blenkhorn, Note,
Islamic Marriage Contracts in America Courts: Interpreting Mahr Agreements as Prenuptials
and Their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 189, 197–98 (2002) (describing
disparate ages of consent for an Islamic marriage contract based on gender, and
observing that such contracts are often negotiated by the groom and a male bridal
80
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about a marriage’s legal standing are resolved under secular, not
religious, law—whether as a matter of public policy, constitutional
protections for marital choice, or concern that to do otherwise might
violate the Establishment Clause.87 A state might defer to religious
officials to confirm certain formalities were observed.88 A state might
also honor Islamic marriages performed overseas based on conflicts
principles and comity, provided public policy is not offended.89 But
sharia norms are facially irrelevant to a marriage’s domestic validity.90
The question becomes trickier in divorce, property, and childcustody disputes.91 Under the “talaq” doctrine, for example, sharia
allows men to divorce their wives through a series of verbal
declarations.92 And although sharia might allow other divorce
relative); Asifa Quraishi & Najeeba Syeed-Miller, No Altars: A Survey of Islamic Family
Law in the United States, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW: PERSPECTIVES ON
REFORM, 177, 192–93 (2009) (describing polygyny in Islamic law).
87
See Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 247–51 (observing that marriages of
minor children are not recognized in the United States as a matter of public policy);
Quraishi & Syeed-Miller, supra note 86, at 192–93 (describing universal prohibition of
polygamy in domestic law, and describing marriage as a personal right that cannot be
forfeited based on the religious identity of one’s partner); Estin, supra note 60, at 550–
51, 551 n.64 (“[P]rovision for an explicitly religious family law regime would violate
the bar on established religion under the First Amendment.”); see also Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (observing that Fourteenth Amendment requires a
“critical examination” where state law significantly interferes with the right to marry).
88
See Aghili v. Saadatnejadi, 958 S.W.2d 784, 787–88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)
(describing state’s marriage solemnization process in Muslim context); see also
Quraishi & Syeed-Miller, supra note 86, at 188 (describing solemnization process
authorized by state laws).
89
See Fallon, supra note 55, at 171–74 (describing both the recognition and limits
of comity in the Islamic law context).
90
See Estin, supra note 60, at 557 (“[D]espite the move toward greater private
ordering of family life, courts and legislatures continue to enforce a set of background
norms based on constitutional values.”); see also Quraishi & Syeed-Miller, supra note
86, at 188 (observing that marriages conducted only under religious rules are “a risky
practice under U.S. law because, barring a finding of common law or putative
marriage, the parties and their children have no state-enforceable legal rights upon
each other”). Limited exceptions to the irrelevance of sharia in the domestic
recognition of marriages have arisen where courts are asked to recognize otherwise
invalid marital arrangements that were valid in a foreign jurisdiction—e.g., a
polygamous marriage or marriage between cousins—but any such recognition arises
as a matter of comity for foreign authority, not independent validation of these
arrangements. See Estin, supra note 60, at 563–65 (describing balancing approach
taken by courts to foreign marriages).
91
See Estin, supra note 60, at 559 (“[B]eyond the rules for celebration of
marriages . . . substantive marriage regulations pose more difficult cultural and legal
conflicts.”).
92
See RAFFIA ARSHAD, ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 111 (2010) (providing a helpful flow
chart on the various steps in a talaq divorce, where a husband unilaterally divorces his
wife through a series of statements and waiting periods, subject only to financial
support in the case of a recent birth).
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methods—with some initiated by women—talaq is the normal form,
and one that reflects a more traditional (and arguably chauvinistic)
view of gender roles.93 On the other hand, sharia typically also requires
marrying couples to first enter a “mahr” agreement, under which the
husband pays a monetary penalty in the event of such summary
divorce.94 Mahr contracts can thus be seen as a way to protect women
from financial burdens and compensate them for income lost in
marriage—though again, this is a practice reflecting a more traditional
view of marriage.95
Despite the religious aspects of talaq or mahr, however, American
courts use secular standards, not religious ones, to determine in the
first instance the reality and consequences of divorce for Muslims.96 As
a matter of comity, our courts might recognize a talaq obtained while
a couple lived abroad—provided its recognition would not violate an
important public policy, like due process or the equitable treatment of
assets.97 But that recognition would be based on domestic respect for
the other country’s authority, not the substance of the religious norm.98
93

SCHACHT, supra note 80, at 164–65.
See Blenkhorn, supra note 86, at 201 (describing mahr agreements as
“compensation to women for men’s unlimited, unilateral right to divorce”); see also
SCHACHT, supra note 80, at 167 (describing mahr as a “powerful limitation” on the right
of husbands to unilaterally divorce).
95
See Blenkhorn, supra note 86, at 201–02 (observing the economic-support
purposes of a mahr agreement and its roots in a particular understanding of marital
gender roles).
96
See, e.g., Shikoh v. Murff, 257 F.2d 306, 309 (2d Cir. 1958) (rejecting a talaq, and
observing that divorce “must be secured in accordance with [state] law[ ]”); Aziz v.
Aziz, 127 Misc. 2d 1013, 1013–14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (enforcing mahr under state
contract law “notwithstanding that it was entered into as part of a religious ceremony,”
and citing in support Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983), where the court
upheld a Jewish couple’s agreement to have a rabbinical tribunal resolve their marital
disputes); see also Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 248, 249 (“Purely religious
divorces . . . are not recognized by state law because states claim exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction over marriage dissolution . . . . [M]ost state judges treat a mahr
clause as they do any other contract clause; it is enforced unless (1) it violates some
basic rule of contract law . . . , or (2) its application would violate public policy”).
97
See Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 501 (Md. 2008) (refusing talaq from Pakistan
where property in husband’s name was not subject to equitable division); Tarikonda
v. Pinjari, No. 387403, 2009 WL 930007, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009) (refusing
talaq from India without “basic rudiments of due process”); see also Ann Laquer Estin,
Toward a Multicultural Family Law, 38 FAM. L.Q. 501, 511 (2004) (observing that
American courts may recognize foreign talaq divorces as a matter of comity, provided
they were obtained with due process); Emily Thompson & F. Soniya Yunus, Choice of
Laws or Choice of Culture: How Western Nations Treat the Islamic Marriage Contract in
Domestic Courts, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 361, 382 (2007) (observing similarly). But see Chaudry
v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000, 1006 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (enforcing Pakistani
talaq and mahr in lieu of greater relief under state spousal-support laws).
98
See Fallon, supra note 55, at 168–74 (framing domestic recognition of sharia94
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No such unilateral divorce would be honored for couples residing
here.99
Mahr contracts are the most distinctive legal feature of Islamic
marriage in this country, even for more “progressive” Muslims.100
Nevertheless, civil courts regularly address them under “neutral
principles”—which include both a broad freedom of contract
(including on a religious basis) and public-policy limits on that
freedom, such as prohibition of contracts that encourage divorce or
protections against the inequitable waiver of marital property.101 At
bottom, mahr contracts are treated no differently than similar
arrangements that limit the future rights of couples in divorce,
whether in the secular or religious context (like the Jewish ketuba).102
Enforcing a mahr can be problematic where, as is sometimes the
custom, a bride’s father or other relative negotiated it.103 Similarly,
because sharia may allow marriage by minors, a mahr’s validity may be
suspect on that basis, too.104 These aspects can clash with Western
based judgments in other countries as a matter of comity).
99
See Estin, supra note 97, at 511 (observing that a talaq divorce “has no secular
legal effect” in the United States).
100
See Quraishi & Syeed-Miller, supra note 86, at 188 (“[M]ost Muslims in the U.S.
seem to consider only one thing really important that would not otherwise be included
in a standard civil marriage license: a provision regarding the wife’s bridal gift or
dower.”).
101
See, e.g., Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 97 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002)
(enforcing mahr under neutral principles of law as a contract between consenting
adults); Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246, 248–49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (same);
Habibi-Fahnrich v. Fahnrich, No. 46186/93, 1995 WL 507388, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1995) (refusing to enforce mahr under statute of frauds); In re Marriage of Shaban,
88 Cal. App. 4th 398, 404–07 (2001) (same); In re Marriage of Dajani, 204 Cal. App.
3d 1387, 1390 (1988) (rejecting mahr as violating state policy against contracts
encouraging divorce); In re Altayar & Muhyaddin, 139 Wash. App. 1066 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2007) (rejecting mahr as inequitable avoidance of state property distribution
rules); see also Estin, supra note 97, at 521–22 (observing that enforcement of mahr
contracts “turn[s] on the law of contract”).
102
See Comment, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and its Variations Throughout
the States, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS 355, 355–59 (2010) (describing
uniform act adopted in twenty-seven states that allows for the enforcement of
premarital agreements); Estin, supra note 60, at 570 (describing California courts’
similar treatment of Jewish and Islamic marital agreements); see also Odatalla, 810 A.2d
at 97 (upholding mahr under “neutral principles” approval of ketuba in Avitzur v.
Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983).
103
See Kecia Ali, Marriage in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence: A Survey of Doctrines, in
THE ISLAMIC MARRIAGE CONTRACT 14–15 (Quraishi & Vogel eds., 2008) (describing
common role of guardian-representative (“wali”) in negotiating marriage contract);
see also BHALA, supra note 74, at 872–73 (describing broad authority of wali over minor
ward). In some traditions, a minor girl’s representative can marry her off against her
will. See SCHACHT, supra note 80, at 161–62.
104
See Blenkhorn, supra note 86, at 198–99 (emphasizing marriage of minors in
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norms of equality and personal autonomy, and can also undercut
marital-property protections where the mahr is deemed a prenuptial
agreement that waives a greater financial award available under state
law.105 But domestic courts will not enforce mahr contracts that are
rooted in coercion or lack of understanding.106 And although there
are outliers, courts commonly refuse to honor agreements that would
waive and then undervalue what a spouse might receive under secular
rules governing the division of property in divorce.107
Finally, regarding child custody, various schools of sharia thought
differ. On the whole, mothers are preferred custodians for their small
children.108 Once adolescence is reached, however, there is in some
circles a distinct preference for custody to originate with, or even
transfer to, fathers, who are often understood as the chief guardian of
a child’s education (particularly for boys).109 But no matter what sharia
might say, domestic courts almost universally apply the secular “best
interests of the child” test in assigning custody.110 Context is of course
important in assessing a child’s best interests, and religious
background and upbringing are not ignored.111 Indeed, religious
factors can be an integral part of the analysis.112 Nevertheless, and as
broad attack on the domestic enforcement of mahr agreements).
105
See Blenkhorn, supra note 86, at 191 (criticizing mahr agreements as depriving
women of property without adequate representation or understanding); Lugo, supra
note 27, at 79 (arguing that the enforcement of mahr agreements endorses an
“institutional discrimination against women”).
106
Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 250.
107
See Chelsea A. Sizemore, Comment, Enforcing Islamic Mahr Agreements: The
American Judge’s Interpretational Dilemma, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1085, 1093 (2011)
(citing cases and noting “discernable trend” about the enforcement of mahr contracts
that “courts are not inclined to enforce these agreements if they are financially
inequitable to one of the parties”). Those opposed to domestic recognition of mahr
contracts invariably point to the New Jersey case of Chaudry, where the court upheld a
$1,500 mahr in lieu of a more sizeable alimony and property claim. But the mahr was
recognized there not in its own right but only as a matter of international comity—i.e.,
the parties were Pakistani citizens and the matter had already been fully litigated there.
Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000, 1005–06 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
108
See ARSHAD, supra note 92, at 152–54 (describing sharia schools of thought on
child custody).
109
See id. at 154–57 (describing transfer or origination of fatherly custody during
adolescence); see also JULIE MACFARLANE, ISLAMIC DIVORCE IN NORTH AMERICA 192–93
(2012) (describing sharia-based gender preferences in post-adolescent custody).
110
See Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 248 (emphasizing the primacy of the “best
interests of the child” custody test as a matter of domestic public policy). See also Ann
Laquer Estin, Foreign and Religious Family Law: Comity, Contract, and the Constitution, 41
PEPP. L. REV. 1029, 1036, 1040 (2014) (same).
111
See Estin, supra note 60, at 593 (“American courts are prepared to recognize that
religious and cultural factors are a legitimate part of a best interests analysis.”).
112
See George L. Blum, Annotation, Religion As Factor in Child Custody Cases, 124
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Professor Quraishi-Landes has also observed, secular public policy
“guides consideration of gendered (and patriarchal) child custody and
guardianship rules found in Islamic family law: they are honored only
if they are found to be consistent with the ‘best interests of the child’
standard.”113
C. Estate Planning
An additional area where sharia commonly arises in the lives of
American Muslims is estate planning. “Planning for death by ensuring
a distribution of one’s estate in accordance with Islamic Sharia law is
obligatory upon all Muslims wishing to comply with their religious
obligations.”114 Indeed, understanding sharia inheritance rules is often
seen as central to understanding what it means to be a Muslim.115 As
the Koran insists of certain distributions, “this is a law from God, and
He is all knowing, all wise.”116 Islamic Law thus contains arguably the
most particular and technical scheme of inheritance rules of all major
religions.117
Islamic inheritance rules originate from detailed provisions in the
Koran, as well as examples from the Prophet and centuries of scholarly
teaching.118 A common understanding of these rules allows a Muslim
to leave up to one-third of his or her estate to an outsider but requires
the remaining two-thirds to be distributed under a relatively strict and
complex formula that, unlike domestic law, creates a “guaranteed
right” to certain inheritance shares in designated family members.119
Protected family status includes spouses, parents, and children, but
also extends to grandparents, grandchildren, and even siblings
A.L.R.5th 203, § 2[b] (2004) (summarizing courts’ considerations of religion in
awarding child custody).
113
Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 248 (emphasis added); see also Jennifer Ann
Drobac, Note, For the Sake of the Children: Court Considerations of Religion in Child Custody
Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1609, 1633–41 (1998) (summarizing cases where religious
factors were rejected based on a broad spectrum of potential harms to child). Courts
will also refuse religious considerations where the litigating parents disagree on such
matters. See Estin, supra note 60, at 548.
114
Mohammedi, supra note 61, at 260; see also ARSHAD, supra note 92, at 187
(quoting the Prophet as saying,”[i]t is the duty of a Muslim who has anything to
bequeath not to let two nights pass without writing a will about it”).
115
See Mohammedi, supra note 61, at 264 (observing that in the Maliki school of
jurisprudence, “knowledge of inheritance law is referred to as half the knowledge of
religion”).
116
THE QUR’AN: A NEW TRANSLATION 51 (M.A.S. Abdel Haleem, ed., 2004).
117
BHALA, supra note 74, at 1092.
118
See ARSHAD, supra note 92, at 188–89 (describing origins and evolution of
inheritance rules).
119
BHALA, supra note 74, at 1093–94.
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(including half-brothers and half-sisters).120
Like other traditional faith practices, sharia-based inheritance
rules tend to “presuppose a patriarchal organization of the family,”121
reflecting a view of the man as chiefly responsible for family welfare.122
For example, shares of husbands and sons are often twice that of wives
and daughters, respectively.123 The rules also do not typically provide
an elective share, where the surviving spouse can choose a default
minimum in the event the sharia amount is inadequate.124 That said,
in response to charges that the system is sexist, its defenders often
point to the system’s complexity, cultural context, and differences
among Muslims as to the rules in question, as well as countervailing
rules that may benefit women—e.g., any outstanding mahr must be
paid as a debt before any other distribution (which would then also
include a share to the wife based on succession).125
An additional controversial aspect of Islamic inheritance arises
from the understanding in some quarters that non-Muslims, including
spouses, are disqualified from any legacy to which they might have had
a right.126 To quote the Prophet, “a Muslim cannot be the heir of a
disbeliever, nor can a disbeliever be the heir of a Muslim.”127 Defenders
of a literal reading of this text stress that the rule does not typically
forbid a decedent from granting a non-believer all or part of the onethird portion of his or her estate left to discretion.128 Nevertheless, even
among faithful Muslims, the “difference of religion” prohibition for
the remainder of the estate is readily acknowledged to be difficult and
potentially divisive.129
120

See id. at 1137–43 (describing estate succession rights of male and female heirs).
SCHACHT, supra note 80, at 170.
122
See BHALA, supra note 74, at 1162 (observing that inheritance rules recognize
the man as the “bread-winner, provider, and protector”); KAMALI, supra note 3, at 273
(observing that any male favoritism in sharia-based estate rules is based chiefly on a
view of the man being in charge of family finances).
123
BHALA, supra note 74, at 1162, 1092, 1141–42, 1148–49 (describing genderbased disparities in sharia-based estate succession rules).
124
Mohammedi, supra note 61, at 276–77 (describing lack of spousal election in
Islamic wills).
125
See id. at 278–79 (discounting feminist critique of sharia inheritance rules as
ignoring other pro-woman aspects of those rules and other dynamics in Muslim
culture); see also BHALA, supra note 74, at 1162–63; ARSHAD, supra note 92, at 192–93
(same).
126
See BHALA, supra note 74, at 1104, 1159 (describing prohibition on non-Muslim
legatees).
127
ARSHAD, supra note 92, at 188 (quoting hadith by Sahih al Bukhari).
128
See id. (observing that prohibitions against non-Muslim inheritance do not apply
to the one-third discretionary share).
129
See BHALA, supra note 74, at 1159 (describing negative cultural implications of
121
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Notwithstanding these controversies, however, the enforceability
of faith-based will terms is a common probate question in the case of
decedents from other religions.130 And the approach courts take is
largely the same as in handling similar marriage and family matters:
private choice is enforced as a matter of personal liberty, subject only
to narrow public-policy or constitutional limits.131 Provided the will
does not require a court to interpret or become unduly tangled in
religious doctrine, distributions based on religious status, like a
“difference of religion” disqualifier, will be upheld as free religious
exercise or under the general right to dispose of one’s property as one
sees fit.132 As the Oregon Supreme Court urged in upholding a similar
term in the Catholic context, “[t]he right to espouse any religious
faith . . . carries with it the cognate right to engage as its champion in
the proselytization of followers or converts.”133 On the other hand,
faith-based terms will more likely be ignored where public policy would
be violated—e.g., where a spouse would lose property relative to what
she might be entitled under a state’s elective share.134
D. Alternative Dispute Resolution
Similar to arrangements found among many orthodox Jews and
an increasing number of Christians, another common and sacred
aspect of Muslim legal affairs is the use of faith-based arbitration or
mediation, rather than the courts, to resolve conflicts.135 Many Muslims
prohibition on non-Muslim inheritance, both externally and within the Muslim
community).
130
See Mohammedi, supra note 61, at 271 (“U.S. courts have long grappled with
conflicts . . . emerging out of the enforcement of religious clauses in wills . . .”).
131
See id. at 270–71 (describing “near-total flexibility and freedom” in all states for
distributing property upon death, subject to narrow public-policy and constitutional
limitations).
132
See id. at 270–81 (describing current and anticipated legal landscape for
domestic enforcement of sharia-compliant wills); see also Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp.
2d 1298, 1307 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (describing testator’s free-exercise interest in making
faith-based bequests).
133
U.S. Nat’l Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 863–64 (Or. 1954).
134
See Mohammedi, supra note 61, at 272, 279–81 (observing that under domestic
law, spouses may not be entirely disinherited and that, in most states, deprivation of
an elective share will be ordered only where a spouse has affirmatively waived the
right—though speculating that a court might ignore the elective share in cases where
the spouse is otherwise adequately protected under the will and attendant
circumstances); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 242–
46 (1989) (describing broad public policy in United States favoring elective share
rights for spouses: “the surviving spouse has clearly become the favorite in
inheritance”).
135
See Grossman, supra note 65, at 177–81 (describing rise in faith-based arbitration
among Jews, Christians, and Muslims); Helfand, supra note 66, at 1243 (same); see also
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prefer private panels—whose members are typically chosen by
religious criteria and charged with applying sharia-based rules—as an
alternative method of dispute resolution more consistent with their
religious faith.136
These dispute-resolution mechanisms are
particularly attractive to today’s American Muslims, who face unique
challenges integrating into a distinctively Western, secular, and at
times hostile, milieu while retaining their own culture.137 As such, faithbased alternative dispute resolution can “play a freedom-enhancing
role . . . by serving as part of the infrastructure that makes religious
freedom possible.”138
Standard faith-based arbitration involves parties agreeing that a
dispute be resolved by co-religionists and according to religiously
derived procedural or substantive rules.139 Examples in three contexts
are as follows:
 Jewish. The parties “‘hereby agree to recognize the Beth
Din of the Rabbinical Assembly . . . or its duly appointed
representatives, as having the authority to counsel us in
light of Jewish tradition . . . and to impose such terms of
compensation as it may see fit for failure to respond to its
summons or carry out its decision.’”140
 Christian. The parties agree to submit their claims to an
arbitration process conducted “‘in accordance with the
Rules of Procedure for Christian Conciliation of the Institute for
Christian Conciliation,’” which in turn provide that “‘the
Holy Scriptures (the Bible) shall be the supreme authority
governing every aspect of the conciliation process.’”141
 Muslim. A party’s claim must be “be submitted to and
settled by arbitration before the Arbitration Court of an
Islamic mosque located in [a chosen state] pursuant to the

Uddin & Pantzer, supra note 14, at 391–92 (describing Muslim interest in faith-based
arbitration).
136
See R. Seth Shippee, Note, “Blessed Are The Peacemakers”: Faith-Based Approaches to
Dispute Resolution, 9 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 237, 245–48 (2002) (detailing sharia-based
alternative dispute resolution).
137
See Michael J. Broyde, Faith-Based Private Arbitration as a Model for Preserving Rights
and Values in a Pluralistic Society, 90 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 111, 113, 134 (2015)
(emphasizing the community-building benefits of faith-based arbitration).
138
Helfand, supra note 66, at 1247.
139
See Grossman, supra note 65, at 182 (describing common aspects of faith-based
arbitration).
140
Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 137 (N.Y. 1983).
141
Encore Prods., Inc. v. Promise Keepers, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1106, 1111 (D.
Colo. 1999).
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laws of Islam.”142
The religious dimension in each instance is unmistakable. But
deference to private decision-makers to resolve disputes on a basis that
might differ from otherwise-applicable law—which, at bottom, is what
the parties are choosing—is, for better or worse, common and
unremarkable. Whether as a matter of religious liberty or civil law
generally, “[a]rbitration is what the parties say it is.”143
Indeed, courts look favorably on private agreements to
arbitrate.144 And faith-based arrangements are no exception.145 As long
as the parties agreed to arbitrate, the arbitrator acted impartially and
within the scope of the agreement, and the result would not violate
public policy, courts will enforce.146 Some raise concerns in the
religious context; for example, that enforcing such arbitration might
threaten free exercise or create an establishment of religion; or
conversely, that courts’ fear of becoming mired in “religious questions”
might cause them to defer unduly.147 But the prevailing “neutral
principles” approach—where courts chiefly apply secular rules to
recognize (or not) faith-based contracts—addresses most of these
concerns.148 Pertinently, there is nothing distinct about Muslim
arbitration on this score. Nor should there be.149
Among the reasons for American Muslims to choose a faith-based
tribunal is not only a sense of religious obligation to abide by Islamic
law, but also that these private tribunals are likely more accessible and
sensitive to corresponding matters of language or culture that might
differ from the Western mainstream.150 Cultural sensitivity might be
142

Abd Alla v. Mourssi, 680 N.W.2d 569, 570 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in
Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1053 (1998).
144
Grossman, supra note 65, at 169 (“[C]ontemporary American statutory and
decisional law on arbitration are in keeping with the unequivocal . . . acceptance of
arbitral adjudication.”) (quoting THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 105 (1989)).
145
Helfand, supra note 66, at 1245 (“[T]he policy favoring arbitration applies to
religious and secular arbitration alike.”); see also Broyde, supra note 137, at 112 (same).
146
See Lee Ann Bambach, The Enforceability of Arbitration Decisions Made by Muslim
Religious Tribunals: Examining the Beth Din Precedent, 25 J.L. & RELIGION 379, 404–05
(2009) (describing (limited) rules for enforceable faith-based arbitration).
147
See id. at 389 (flagging constitutional concerns of religious arbitration).
148
See Charles P. Trumbull, Note, Islamic Arbitration: A New Path for Interpreting
Islamic Legal Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 609, 625 (2006) (“The neutral-principles
doctrine has helped clarify which sorts of disputes courts may adjudicate without
excessively entangling church and state.”).
149
See Bambach, supra note 146, at 389.
150
See id. at 404–05 (describing reasons Muslims might choose faith-based
arbitration).
143
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important, for example, where a mahr agreement would require
payment in a non-fault divorce situation or a sharia-compliant business
contract would prohibit the charging of interest. In these and similar
situations, Muslim arbitrators can render decisions in light of shared
norms, values, and rules that secular judges might miss.151
Sharia-based arbitration can, of course, resolve matters differently
than had the parties gone to court. For better or worse, agreements to
be bound by religious arbitration do not face the First Amendment
dilemmas that might require a court to follow secular legal principles
or remain blind to nuances of religious doctrine.152 A talaq, for
example, would more likely be recognized in arbitration, as would
remedies available only under sharia, because the enforcement
question does not concern the validity of the practice at issue but the
authority of the body charged with deciding the dispute. But in these
cases of course, the parties wanted—at least ex ante—to use this method
to resolve their dispute.153
As with any arbitration agreement, involuntariness or duress at its
signing will void the provision.154 Public policy can also preclude
arbitration. In domestic-relations cases, for example, the “‘protective
function’ of family law” typically leads courts to apply heightened
scrutiny.155
Similarly, arbitration will not be enforced where
procedures are unfair or fail to afford due process.156 Some critics
alternatively suggest that enforcing secular courts may be more
reluctant to interfere with faith-based tribunals due to constitutional
concerns or fail to appreciate cultural pressures that might prevail
when faith-based agreements are entered.157 But there is nothing
151

Helfand, supra note 66, at 1268.
See Trumbull, supra note 148, at 612–13 (describing constitutional and
evidentiary limitations on the courts’ ability to interpret and apply contracts that
implicate Islamic law).
153
See Michael A. Helfand, Fighting for the Debtor’s Soul: Regulating Religious
Commercial Conduct, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157, 169 (2011) (“Without the consent of
the parties, religious arbitration tribunals simply lack any enforcement power.”).
154
See Grossman, supra note 65, at 197 (describing duress exception to arbitration,
though doubting its full effectiveness in the religious context, where coercion may be
part of the faith).
155
Estin, supra note 60, at 599–600; see also Elsayed, supra note 1, at 975 (observing
that the private arbitration of family law matters “require[s] closer scrutiny to ensure
fairness”).
156
See Bambach, supra note 146, at 396 (describing courts’ rejection of Beth Din
agreements where resulting arbitration procedures were “insufficient to protect a
party’s due process rights”).
157
See Grossman, supra note 65, at 186–87, 197–98 (describing undue arbitrator
deference that can result from “neutral principles” approach in religious context, and
duress and lack of due process often inherent in religious understandings of
152
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constitutionally distinct about sharia-based arbitration, nor is family or
community pressure short of legal duress unique to the Muslim
community.158
In sum, the life of a practicing Muslim involves not only formal
worship but also a host of legal practices that might differ from the
secular approach in various areas, including marriage and family,
estate planning, and alternative dispute resolution. These faith-based
practices, however, are recognized (or not) under the established
approach of American law to religious accommodation, including its
corresponding limiting principles, and not as a religious matter.159
IV. SHARIA’S DOMESTIC DISCONTENTS
Despite the limited, yet cherished, applications of sharia for
Muslims in America, a concerted effort is afoot to limit their ability to
so handle their own affairs. As a constitutional enterprise, the effort
has had mixed results; the leading sharia-specific ban (adopted in
Oklahoma by voter referendum in 2010, with over 70-percent support)
has since been struck down as unconstitutional, and “anti-sharia”
advocates have needed to become more creative.160 But the march
continues, and, in many ways, its newer, subtler manifestations—
which, on their face, tend to target only “foreign” law—are perhaps all
the more corrosive to religious liberty.161 If, as the drafters of the 2014
Florida statute and Alabama constitutional amendment have observed,
sharia is a “dreadful disease” that is “invading” America and must be
addressed for the sake of the future, the challenge is clear.162
arbitration); see also Amanda M. Baker, A Higher Authority: Judicial Review of Religious
Arbitration, 37 VT. L. REV. 157, 158 (2002) (raising similar criticisms).
158
See Bambach, supra note 146, at 389 (arguing there is nothing distinct about
constitutional deference to Muslim arbitration when compared with its Jewish
counterpart); Volokh, supra note 13, at 435 (observing that community and family
pressures are common to Muslim, Jewish, and Christian communities, and are an
unremarkable part of the calculus in the American freedom-of-contract system); see
also Fallon, supra note 55, at 180 (arguing that the established approach to the Jewish
arbitration experience should inform legal approaches to sharia-based arbitration).
159
See Volokh, supra note 13, at 431–32 (describing American approach to sharia
recognition).
160
See Vischer, supra note 23, at 27.
161
See Omar Sacirbey, Anti-Shariah Movement Changes Tactics and Gains Success,
RELIGIOUS NEWS SERVICE (May 16, 2013), www.religionnews.com/2013/05/16/antishariah-movement-changes-tactics-and-gains-success/ (describing change in tactics by
the “anti-Sharia movement” and the continued concern among civil-rights groups
raised by “anti-foreign” law bills).
162
Tiffany Gabbay, Bill That Would Ban Sharia Law in Family Cases Passes Fla. Senate,
THE BLAZE (Apr. 9, 2013), www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/04/09/bill-that-wouldban-sharia-law-in-family-cases-passes-fla-senate/#; Tim Lockette, Legislation Would Ban
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Whether because of the foreign nature of Islamic culture,
confusion over the reality and effect of domestic conflicts rules (which
largely preclude the harms feared by “sharia-in-America” opponents),
misplaced theological disagreement, or mere prejudice, in the past five
years legislation has been proposed in at least thirty-two states, and
enacted so far in nine, that targets adherence to sharia as an
illegitimate exercise of religious freedom.163 Not every provision
mentions sharia by name; that would likely fail First Amendment
scrutiny, as the Tenth Circuit made clear in blocking Oklahoma’s “Save
Our State” amendment.164 But even where sharia is not specified, it is
the cause and object of these initiatives; the enemy that shall remain
nameless.165

Islamic Law in Alabama Courts, ANNISTON STAR (Mar. 4, 2011), http://annistonstar.
uber.matchbin.net/pages/full_story/push?article-Legislation+would+ban+Islamic+
law+in+Alabama+courts-%20&id=12157691 (describing earlier, sharia-specific effort
by the sponsor of the foreign-law initiative approved by Alabama voters in November
2014 election).
163
See David L. Nersessian, How Legislative Bans on Foreign and International Law
Obstruct the Practice and Regulation of American Lawyers, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1647, 1700 app.
(2012) (providing table of “state blocking measures on international and foreign
law”). The following nine state statutes target (directly or indirectly) the application
of sharia: ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13.50 (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3101 (2013);
FLA. STAT. § 61.0401 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5103 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:6001 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:705(C)(1)(p) (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-87.12
(2013); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 12, § 20 (2012); OKLA. CONST. ART. 7, § 1(b) (2010); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 19-8-7 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-15-101 (2010). Idaho passed a
bill asking Congress to outlaw the use of foreign law by domestic courts, but did not
do so itself. See H.R. Con. Res. 44, 60th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2010). Legislation
has also been proposed in at least twenty-three other states: Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See PEW RESEARCH CTR.,
FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, STATE LEGISLATION RESTRICTING USE OF FOREIGN OR
RELIGIOUS LAW, 2010–2012, at 2–33 (2013), www.pewforum.org/files/ 2013/04/Statelegislation-restricting-foreign-or-religious-law.pdf; see also S. 265, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Vt. 2014).
164
Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1119 (10th Cir. 2012).
165
See Vischer, supra note 23, at 78 (describing “clear” targeting of Islam through
“foreign law” provisions); see also Faiza Patel & Amos Toh, The Clear Anti-Muslim Bias
Behind Anti-Sharia Laws, WASH. POST, (Feb. 21, 2014), www.brennancenter.org/
analysis/clear-anti-muslim-bias-behind-anti-shariah-laws/ (same); Steve Chapman, The
Bogus Threat From Sharia Law, TOWNHALL.COM (June 10, 2012), http://townhall.
com/columnists/stevechapman/2012/06/10/the_bogus_threat_from_shariah_law/
page/full (same).
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The “anti-sharia” trend can generally be divided into three
categories:
 Express Anti-Sharia Provisions: laws prohibiting the
application of sharia by name; i.e., courts “shall not
consider sharia law.”166 Oklahoma is the only state that has
passed a sharia-specific law (there, a constitutional
amendment by ballot initiative), but similar bills have been
introduced in at least nine more states.167
 Religious-Law Bans: laws prohibiting or limiting the
application of religious law generally; i.e., courts may not
enforce “any religious code.”168 Both South Dakota and
Louisiana recently passed laws expressly targeting religious
codes, and legislation has been introduced in at least four
more states.169
 Foreign-Law Bans: laws prohibiting or limiting the
application of foreign law, without specific mention of
sharia or other religious law. The typical provision,
inspired by the model-law project “American Law for
American Courts,” forbids the application of “foreign or
international” law where it would violate the state or federal
constitution to do so. Laws of this type have recently been
adopted in Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.170 Related bills
(or constitutional referenda) have been offered in at least
twenty-three more states.171
166

See OKLA. CONST. ART. 7, § 1(b) (2012) (providing that, inter alia, “[t]he courts
shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures” and “[s]pecifically,
the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law”).
167
See PEW, supra note 163 (describing proposed legislation that makes specific
mention of sharia, or Islamic law, having been introduced in the following nine states:
Alabama, Arizona, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Wyoming).
168
See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-8-7 (2012) (“No court, administrative agency, or
other governmental agency may enforce any provisions of any religious code.”).
169
See id.; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:705(C)(1)(p) (2012). Un-passed bills (or
constitutional referenda) targeting “religious law” have been offered in at least four
states: Arizona, Georgia, Iowa, and Texas. See PEW, supra note 163.
170
See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13.50 (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3101 (2013);
FLA. STAT. § 61.0401 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5103 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:6001 (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-87.12 (2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 20 (2012); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 20-15-101 (2010).
171
Bills limiting foreign law have been introduced (but not passed) in at least
twenty-three states: Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Vermont, West
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Each type of legislation varies in its practical effects and
constitutionality. But without much digging, the universal anti-Islamic
message becomes clear.172 Indeed, all three types have their genesis in
the “American Laws for American Courts” project begun in 2009,
which frames “Islamic Sharia Law” as its chief target.173
A. Sharia-Specific Bans
Practically speaking, laws that expressly prohibit courts from
considering sharia (category #1) would render unenforceable—or at
least judicially suspect—many arrangements cherished by Muslim
Americans that were described in the last section—e.g., mahr
agreements, wills with sharia distribution rules, faith-based
arbitration.174 For example, a will that includes a “difference in
religion” term or incorporates the teachings of the Prophet would face
significant obstacles in probate.175 Similarly, sharia-specific bans would
undercut contracts to arbitrate before private panels in accordance
with Islam.176 And marriage-based contracts that might require
extrinsic evidence to clarify their validity or terms—a typical scenario—
would be jeopardized, if not made unenforceable.177

Virginia, and Wyoming. See PEW, supra note 163; see also S. 265, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Vt. 2014).
172
See Patel & Toh, supra note 165 (observing that “the legislators leading the
charge for foreign-law bans have not been shy about their [anti-Muslim] agenda”).
173
American Laws for American Courts, AM. PUB. POLICY ALLIANCE, http://public
policyalliance.org/legislation/american-laws-for-american-courts/ (last visited Sept.
24, 2014); see also Fallon, supra note 55, at 161–62 (describing origins of “anti-sharia”
trend); FAIZA PATEL ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
FOREIGN LAW BANS: LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 1 (2013),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/ForeignLawBans.p
df (observing that the foreign-law ban trend “spring[s] from a movement whose goal
is the demonization of the Islamic faith”).
174
See Elsayed, supra note 1, at 953–54 (describing various practical effects of laws
that expressly prohibit the consideration of sharia).
175
See, e.g., Mohammedi, supra note 61, at 275–76 (describing faith-based bequest
terms that require at least consideration of sharia); Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F.Supp. 2d
1298, 1303–04 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (finding reasonable a plaintiff’s concern that his
faith-based will would not be probated under Oklahoma’s anti-sharia law). Among
other things, Mr. Awad’s will provided that moneys be given to charity and that his
body be prepared and point toward Mecca, according to express rules “found in Sahih
Bukhari” (a sacred text). Udin & Pantzer, supra note 14, at 390.
176
See Uddin & Pantzer, supra note 14, at 406–17 (describing the implications of
anti-sharia laws on the enforceability of Islamic arbitration agreements).
177
See Elsayed, supra note 1, at 954 (describing situations short of determining
religious doctrine where courts would need to consider sharia in making a
determination in the marriage setting).
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Fortunately, states that would single out Islam for inferior
treatment face distinct First Amendment obstacles, as the Tenth
Circuit held in Awad v. Ziriax.178 Indeed, laws that target one religion
over another are constitutionally suspect, and can therefore be
justified only if they pass strict scrutiny.179 Because supporters of the
Oklahoma law could point to no “actual problem” caused by the
application of sharia in that state, the law failed to pass constitutional
muster.180 And based on a “top ten” list of offending cases compiled by
the American Laws for American Courts project, there appears no
compelling interest elsewhere either.181 (Of the listed cases only three
ultimately applied sharia, and in limited circumstances: two honored
overseas custody awards but only where the foreign court had used the
best-interest-of-the-child test, while the third refused to disturb an
overseas divorce judgment with a (limited) mahr but because there was
scant evidence of unfairness and the couple had left the United States
long ago.)182
In any event, however, the fact that the Oklahoma amendment
passed with overwhelming public support and similar bills have been
proposed in nine other states is alone cause for continued concern
over manifest anti-Muslim sentiment in this context.183 As one
commenter put it: Oklahoma’s law “is emblematic of a new kind of
legal assault on the citizenship of American Muslims whereby they are
publicly ostracized as ‘religious and political outsiders.’”184
178

670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1126–29 (10th Cir. 2012) (relying on Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228
(1982)).
180
Id. at 1130.
181
See AM. PUB. POLICY ALLIANCE, supra note 173 (listing ten cases where sharia law
was, according to the authors, wrongfully applied).
182
See Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988, 1010–11 (Md. 1996) (enforcing overseas
custody order based on court’s use of best-interest-of-child test); In re Marriage of
Malak, 182 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1025–29 (1986) (same); Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d
1000, 1006 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (refusing to modify oversees divorce decree
and limited support award based on inadequate showing of unfairness and lack of
significant connection to New Jersey); see also Matthew J. Franck, A Solution in Search of
a Problem, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 15, 2012), www.national review.com/ bench/bench-memos/303028/solution-search-problem-matthew-j-franck (criticizing a
similar “top 20” list of “applications” of sharia for providing limited evidence of any
problem).
183
See Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F.Supp. 2d 1198, 1206 (W.D. Okla. 2013) (finding “any
reasonable voter” on Oklahoma initiative would have perceived the measure “as a
referendum on Sharia law” and “voters would not have approved the amendment
without the unconstitutional provisions”); see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE NEW
RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE 11–13 (2012) (describing rise in anti-Muslim animus
evidenced by anti-sharia movement in Oklahoma and elsewhere).
184
Ali, supra note 20, at 1031.
179
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B. No Religious Codes
Regarding the second type of “anti-sharia” measure—the “no
religious code” variant (category #2)—there is little improvement as a
symbolic, practical, or even constitutional matter. The language of
such legislation may not single out Islam, but there is little question it
remains the target. As one South Dakota leader observed, the state’s
“no religious code” law “answer[s] the question of the Shariah law”
without naming it.185 Likewise, the sponsor of Texas’s proposed
“religious or cultural law” prohibition singled out sharia as the chief
reason for the bill, claiming that “[w]e want to prevent [sharia’s
subjugation of women] from ever happening in Texas.”186 For better
or worse—and perhaps ironically—supporters of such laws stress
concerns over the merits of sharia rather than religious law generally;
indeed, they are often religiously partisan themselves.187 One need
only look at the proposal in Georgia—which redundantly sought to
prohibit faith-based “lashing, flogging, [and] stoning” or “forced
marriage”—to infer these provisions are more about politics than
law.188
In any event, the proposition that religion should be banished
entirely from the courts would have a significant practical impact on
people of all faiths, not just Muslims. Assuming a non-redundant
interpretation of such a law—i.e., that it is not merely restating the
religious-question abstention principle required by the First
Amendment—then any will, contract, or foreign judgment containing,
or even mirroring, religious law would be in doubt.189 If, as South
Dakota’s law provides, a court may not “enforce any provisions of any
religious code,” wills with Islamic inheritance rules, covenant-marriage
contracts among Evangelical Christians, and Jewish Beth Din
185

Karl Huus, South Dakota Lawmakers Tackle ‘Shariah question’, NBC NEWS (Mar. 2,
2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/03/02/10553424-south-dakota-law
makers-tackle-shariah-question.
186
Anna M. Tinsley, Texas Lawmakers Considering Sharia Law Ban, FT. WORTH STARTELEGRAM, Apr. 11, 2011, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/04/11/111934/texaslawmakers-considering-sharia.html (quoting Texas state representative Leo Berman).
187
See Lomi Kriel, Muslim Group Seeks to Educate Houstonians on Islamic Law,
HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 12, 2012, at B1 (describing support of anti-sharia laws from
conservative Christian community, sometimes as a matter of “religious freedom”).
188
S. Res. 926, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2012); see also Volokh, supra 13, at
457 (describing enforcement of domestic criminal law as an obvious and vigorous
protections against violence undertaken in the name of religion).
189
See Eugene Volokh, South Dakota Ban on Court Enforcement of Religious Law,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 7, 2012), http://volokh.com/2012/12/07/south-dakotaban-on-court-enforcement-of-religious-law/ (describing broad implications of a nonredundant interpretation of South Dakota’s no-religious-law provision).
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arbitration agreements could all be unenforceable.190
As for the constitutionality of global religious-law prohibitions,
they are arguably less offensive than sharia-specific measures given the
facially neutral approach. Nevertheless, the singling out of religion in
such provisions—if not the anti-Islamic animus motivating their
proposal—renders them constitutionally suspect. As the Supreme
Court urged in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah: “[a]t
a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the
law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or
prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.”191
Moreover, to the extent anti-religious motivations are at play, “[t]he
Free Exercise Clause protects against government hostility which is
masked, as well as overt.”192
Supporters might respond that laws prohibiting the judicial
application of religious codes are necessary to prevent their undue
recognition by the courts and the purported harms they cause—
interests presumably compelling enough to justify legislative action.193
But the First Amendment itself forbids religious establishments—i.e.,
imposing religious law as such.194 And most of the alleged harms at
issue—e.g., physical violence, deprivation of civil rights—are already
addressed by well-established state criminal laws and public policy.195
In short, these measures are either redundant or unconstitutional.
C. Foreign-Law Limitations
Finally, the most common and “stealthiest” attack on the use of
sharia—particularly after the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Awad—is the
“foreign law” statute (category #3).196 At least eight states have adopted
such laws (Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, and Tennessee), and bills have been proposed in
190

See id. (providing examples of faith-based arrangements jeopardized by
religious-code laws).
191
508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993).
192
Id. at 534.
193
See, e.g., Huus, supra note 185 (describing establishment and personal-harm
concerns driving South Dakota law); Kriel, supra note 187, at B1 (describing Texas
effort’s entanglement focus).
194
See Volokh, supra note 189 (describing the redundancy of various establishment
concerns behind no-religious-code measures).
195
See Grunert, supra note 5, at 725–26 (describing the redundancy of domestic
anti-sharia measures: “For all of their gloomy predictions of Islamization in the
American heartland, anti-sharia activists have failed to explain how or why United
States civil and criminal law, supported by over one hundred years of Supreme Court
precedent, would suddenly cease to apply to Muslim-Americans.”).
196
Vischer, supra note 23, at 27.
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twenty-three other states, from Alaska to Vermont.197 And although
these foreign-law statutes stand up better to constitutional muster, and
many arguably add little to the law—e.g., by simply requiring courts to
act constitutionally—they may be the most insidious of all to the
interests of religious liberty.198
States have taken two general approaches to the foreign-law
statute. The first, and most typical, version limits or prohibits the
enforcement of any foreign law that would itself result in a violation of
the state or federal constitution, laws, or public policy.199 Alabama,
Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Tennessee have
enacted this sort of law to varying degrees; bills have been offered in
thirteen other states.200 The second version of the foreign-law statute
prohibits courts from considering the laws of any foreign system that
fails to afford rights akin to those under the state or federal
constitution, regardless the specific law or judgment at issue in the
case.201 Statutes of this latter type have been passed in Kansas and
Oklahoma (after the failed referendum); bills have been offered in
eight states.202
Requiring courts to act constitutionally should not really have a
direct impact on the use of sharia in domestic courts. Because
religious law is implicated only where its use is otherwise in accord with
(or perhaps even required by) the constitution, foreign-law statutes
that would set the constitution as a limit should be pointless, at least
197

See supra notes 170, 171 (citing state anti-foreign law provisions).
See Vischer, supra note 23, at 27–28 (“Even though the First Amendment has
now forced anti-Sharia advocates to frame their proposed laws so broadly as to be
meaningless, these initiatives should be vigorously contested by the defenders of
religious liberty.”).
199
See PATEL ET AL., supra note 173, at 18 tbl. 1 (listing states with foreign-law
measures triggered by direct violation of the state or federal constitution, laws, or
policy).
200
See id.; ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13.50 (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3101 (2013);
FLA. STAT. § 61.0401 (2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:6001 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 187.12 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-15-101 (2010).
201
See PATEL ET AL., supra note 173, at 18 tbl. 1 (listing states with foreign-law
measures). See also Estin, supra note 110, at 1032 (lamenting “broad comparative
constitutional law inquiry” required by system-based foreign law prohibitions).
202
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5103 (2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 20 (2012) (referencing
a law enacted by the Oklahoma legislature in 2013 to replace the state’s defunct antiSharia constitutional amendment). See also Eugene Volokh, California Court: ‘The
Probable Use of Islamic Law in a Civil Action . . . Offends California Policy,’ WASH. POST (Nov.
4,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2014/11/04/california-court-the-probable-use-of-islamic-law-in-a-civil-action-offendscalifornia-policy/ (criticizing California state court order refusing to recognize Iranian
law based on systemic problems, or, as the superior court put it, “Iran is run by mullahs
and lacks an independent judiciary and due process of law”).
198
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from a legal perspective.203 As Professor Vischer has noted, “American
courts are generally not in the business of issuing rulings that violate
litigants’ constitutional rights.”204 Moreover, because violations of
public policy already limit applications of foreign law, foreign-law
statutes that include public policy as a further limiting ground should
really be no stronger than constitutional limits; again, as a legal
matter.205 Likewise, even in states that would prohibit the application
of foreign law where doing so would conflict with state law, any such
application would be driven by the state’s conflicts rules, and thus, by
its nature, should be understood as consistent with state law—in its
entirety—anyway.206
Courts, however, may differ in their interpretation of
constitutional, public-policy, or other state-law limits, causing (at a
minimum)
significant
uncertainty
for
faith-based
legal
arrangements—not only for Muslims but all believers. For example,
one might interpret Arizona’s ban on the “enforcement” of foreign law
where “doing so would violate” state or federal law as forbidding any
result that differs from domestic law; as opposed to requiring only that
the state’s conflicts rules operate.207 Similarly, a court might evaluate
whether an underlying foreign judgment was obtained according to
domestic procedural standards (beyond the state’s conflicts rules) in
interpreting the Louisiana or North Carolina statutes, which refuse
such judgments if a constitutional violation “results.”208 Finally, a court
might reject an arbitration order under these laws where the panel
203

See Elsayed, supra note 1, at 965 (calling “superfluous” foreign-law statutes to the
extent that they would “prohibit courts from basing their decisions on foreign legal
systems that do not provide the same protections guaranteed under the U.S.
Constitution”); Fallon, supra note 55, at 176 (“Given that by the very definition of
comity, principles of foreign law do not override the U.S. Constitution, efforts to ban
Sharia [on that basis] are simply unnecessary.”).
204
Vischer, supra note 23, at 27.
205
See Volokh, supra note 21, at 236 (“Existing choice of law rules contain many
tools that ensure American courts do not apply a foreign law that is sufficiently against
American public policy.”).
206
See Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 246 (describing a pre-existing conflictsbased approach to the application of religious law).
207
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3101 (2013); see also Matt Anderson, The Threat to
Interest-Free Home Financing: The Problem of State Governments’ Prohibition of IslamicCompliant Financing Agreements, 37 HAMLINE L. REV. 311, 334 (2014) (describing
uncertainty caused by foreign-law statutes in the enforcement of contracted-for choiceof-law provisions).
208
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:6001 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-87.12 (2013); see also
PATEL ET AL., supra note 173, at 32 (“[S]tate courts acting under a foreign law ban
may . . . refus[e] enforcement when foreign proceedings deviate from specific
procedures considered constitutionally necessary to satisfy the requirement of due
process in the United States.”).
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addressed religious questions in a manner contrary to the
In these respects, common “foreign”
Establishment Clause.209
approaches such as faith-based tribunals, contracted-for waivers of
rights, or judgments obtained without a jury would all be at risk
regardless whether they would otherwise be honored as a matter of
comity.210
In any event, the fact that this first version of the foreign-law
statute (i.e., no violation of constitution, public policy, or other
domestic law) is superfluous at the least, and confusing at the most,
may be its greatest significance. To the extent these statutes are
unnecessary, their (often-dogged) pursuit can rightly be perceived as
nothing more than an attempt to divide and stigmatize.211 And based
on their common legislative history, the unspoken enemy is Muslim.212
One need only read the recently adopted Alabama measure, which
restricts the use of laws established “by any people, group, or culture
different from the Constitution and laws of the United States or the State
of Alabama,” to get the implication.213 Finally, even where the impact
is unclear, the chilling effect on the personal affairs of those potentially
affected is unmistakable.214 (The fact that several states exempt
corporations from their new foreign-law rules only furthers the notion
that they are more about degrading religious practice than protecting
domestic legal principles).215
209

See Samir Islam, Comment, The Negative Effects of Ill-Advised Legislation: The
Curious Case of the Evolution of Anti-Sharia Law Legislation into Anti-Foreign Law Legislation
and the Impact on the CISG, 57 HOW. L.J. 979, 1016 (2014) (describing possible
entanglement problems for enforcing faith-based arbitration under an anti-foreign law
regime).
210
See PATEL ET AL., supra note 173, at 23 (describing the wide impacts on the lives
of Muslims and other faiths of even narrow foreign-law statutes).
211
See Vischer, supra note 23, at 28 (observing that unnecessary foreign-law statutes
“serve[ ] only to fan the flames of religious intolerance while nurturing public
acceptance of the notion that the religious commitments of our citizens have no place
in our courts”).
212
See PATEL ET AL., supra note 173, at 33–35 (describing anti-Muslim legislative
history of foreign-law statutes: “as the history of these bans shows, anti-foreign law
measures have been pushed, in large part, by those who openly advocate an antiIslamic agenda”).
213
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13.50 (2014) (emphasis added).
214
See Islam, supra note 209, at 1015–16 (describing “chilling effects” of foreign-law
statutes).
215
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13.50(h) (2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:6001(g) (2013);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-15-101 (2010). The fact that exceptions are made might also
undercut the constitutionality of foreign-law statutes. See Fraternal Order of Police
Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 365–66 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying
strict scrutiny under the First Amendment to laws that treat substantial categories of
secular conduct more favorably than religious conduct; there, beard rules for police
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The second version of the foreign-law statute—i.e., no application
of laws from an out-of-sync system—is less common, but more
significant as a practical matter. In Kansas, for example, courts cannot
enforce foreign laws arising from a “code or system that would not
grant the parties affected by the ruling or decision the same
fundamental liberties, rights and privileges granted under the United
States and Kansas constitutions.”216 Naturally, examining the domestic
legitimacy of an entire legal system rather than determining whether
enforcing a particular law or judgment violates public policy breaks
from traditional conflicts doctrine and related notions of comity.217
And the disqualifying circumstances are broad, including most
domestic-relations arrangements from countries that otherwise lack
full gender equality (a common scenario), almost any faith-based
arbitration (which would include established religious rules in conflict
with the First Amendment), and any choice-of-law provision involving
a jurisdiction without, say, a civil-jury trial.218
The foreign-system approach is particularly harmful to Muslims.
Mahr contracts, which are common among Muslim married couples,
are often entered into in countries that neither separate church and
state nor treat men and women equally, and would thus be rejected on
that basis no matter their terms.219 And because foreign “systems” are
not limited to sovereign nations, but could also include religious
codes, any estate plan based on sharia would be suspect given the many
differences between faith-based systems like sharia and Western
secular law, even if the estate terms at issue are unremarkable.220

officers).
216
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5103 (2012).
217
See generally Fallon, supra note 55 (describing clash between anti-sharia laws and
comity).
218
See Volokh, supra note 21, at 238–42 (describing implications of the Kansas-style
approach to foreign law on domestic relations and choices of foreign law in business
contracts); Islam, supra note 209, at 1016 (describing impacts on faith-based
arbitration).
219
See Ryan H. Boyer, Comment, “Unveiling” Kansas’s Ban on Application of Foreign
Law, 61 KAN. L. REV. 1061, 1079 (2013) (outlining challenges to mahr enforcement
under Kansas statute); see also Soleimani v. Soleimani, No. 11CV4668, ¶ 27 (D. Ct.
Johnson Cnty. Kan. 2012), available at www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/09/soleimani.pdf (describing impacts of the new Kansas law: “Thus, if a
premarital agreement in the context of [the new statute], was the product of a legal
system which is obnoxious to equal rights based on gender, a court could not become
a proxy to perpetuating such discrimination.”).
220
See generally Mohammedi, supra note 61 (describing non-Western estate
practices that are sacred to Muslims and should be respected as a matter of freedom
of contract).
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Sharia-based arbitration would similarly be at risk.221 Finally, and like
their foreign-law counterparts, the legislative history behind these
foreign-system laws plainly reveals their target is sharia and the affairs
of Muslims, with particularized stigma on the basis of religious belief
the inevitable result.222
In sum, whether prohibiting sharia or religious law outright or
limiting the application of foreign law, the wave of recent laws on the
subject unnecessarily disrupts the free exercise by Muslim Americans
of their religious faith, and more.
V. SHARIA AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Thomas Jefferson famously observed of the removal of Christianspecific language from an earlier draft of the 1786 Virginia Act for
Religious Freedom (the First Amendment’s chief precursor) that the
Act was thus “meant to comprehend, within the mantle of its
protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and Mohammedan,
the Hindoo and Infidel of every denomination.”223 And although the
protection of non-Christians was not without controversy at our
nation’s founding,224 the global concept of religious freedom as a
universal human right, no matter the particular faith practiced—or
not practiced, as the case may be—has since become constitutional
dogma.225 The Supreme Court declared in 1952, accommodating
religious choices “follows the best of our traditions.”226

221

See Elsayed, supra note 1, at 967 (observing that sharia arbitration differs from
constitutional procedures). An examination of religious arbitration may also violate
the Establishment Clause, by requiring the court to examine the adequacy of
particular religious laws; or the Free Exercise Clause, by prohibiting arbitration in
situations where secular arbitration would be allowed. See id. at 966–68 (describing
First Amendment implications of foreign-system scrutiny).
222
See Boyer, supra note 219, at 1069 (describing anti-Muslim bias in Kansas
legislative history).
223
THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1821), reprinted in 1 WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 66–67 (A. Lipscomb et al. eds., 1903).
224
See DENISE A. SPELLBERG, THOMAS JEFFERSON’S QUR’AN: ISLAM AND THE FOUNDERS
3–11 (2013) (describing conflicting views at the founding on the rights of Muslims).
225
See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989) (“Perhaps in the
early days of the Republic [the First Amendment was] understood to protect only the
diversity within Christianity, but today [it is] recognized as guaranteeing religious
liberty and equality to ‘the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith
such as Islam or Judaism.’”) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985)); see
also Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (observing that
the First Amendment includes the protections of all faiths).
226
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
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Religious freedom is perhaps nowhere more important than
where a given practice or belief is controversial or unpopular. As
Justice Robert Jackson poignantly emphasized for the Supreme Court
in upholding the right of Jehovah’s Witnesses to refuse to salute the
flag, “freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the
existing order.”227 Moreover, the Court has since noted, “religious
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible
to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”228 And this
protection applies both to beliefs and actions; the latter may be subject
to greater government regulation, of course, but never in a
discriminatory way—barring compelling circumstances.229
In light of these norms, sacred practices pursued by Muslim
Americans under sharia-based religious or foreign law should be
protected (or not) according to existing conflicts and constitutional
rules. They should not be singled out for disfavored treatment. To
the common observer of law and religion in the United States, it is not
unusual for believers to choose a set of principles to govern their
affairs; nor is it rare for private arbitration arrangements or foreign
judgments to reflect religious practices.230 To target Muslims,
therefore, is not only inconsistent with how we treat similar
arrangements in other faiths but clashes with domestic notions of
familial subsidiarity, freedom of contract, and religious freedom. It
also places Muslims, and faith-based arrangements generally, in an
inferior position relative to analogous secular relationships—e.g.,
contracts that mention religion or other “foreign” concepts, as
opposed to those that do not.231
The current push to outlaw “sharia in America” poses a significant
threat to the Muslim family, whether by refusing to enforce domesticrelation arbitration agreements, nullifying mahr contracts, or
dishonoring marriages and divorces first entered into in Muslim
227

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
229
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532–
34 (1993) (describing non-discriminatory approach to religious beliefs and actions
under First Amendment).
230
See Volokh, supra note 13, at 431–32 (describing common occurrence in
American law for faith-based estate planning, contracting, arbitration, and domestic
relations).
231
See Schmitz, supra note 25, at 1 (observing that domestic anti-sharia laws
“assault[ ] religious liberty by putting contracts with a religious motivation on an
unequal footing with contracts that have no religious motivation”).
228
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countries.232 And in striking at “the heart” of sharia (i.e., the family),
affected states either discriminate directly against Islam or malign it as
an alien way of life inherently subject to suspicion.233 Domestic “antisharia” measures also undermine the (often predominant) religious
interests in marriage and family life, and the corresponding balance
with state authority in this context achieved with almost every other
religion throughout our history.234
Muslim Americans, and religious liberty generally, also suffer
from the impact of “anti-sharia” measures on estate-planning practices.
In this context, the twin freedoms of contract and testamentary
disposition are undercut based not on the merits of the bequest but on
religious grounds (also a common element in such deeply personal
circumstances).235 Although courts may not resolve disputes over the
merits or substance of religious beliefs—in this or any other
circumstance—the fundamental ability to dispose of one’s own
property as one sees fit should not vary based on the motivations
behind that disposal.236 And where, as in the case of Islam, specialized
dispositions may be a fundamental duty of the faith, the need for
protection is clear—particularly absent an “actual problem” to the
contrary.237
As for faith-based dispute resolution, “anti-sharia” measures
diminish the religious-liberty aspects of communal decision-making,
which is important to many religions but particularly minority faiths
that may be understandably skittish about a majority-led justice
232

See generally Abed Awad, Islamic Family Law in American Courts, in MUSLIM FAMILY
LAW IN WESTERN COURTS 168 (E. Giunchi ed., 2014) (describing current (stable) state
of resolving marital disputes in domestic courts and the threat to such arrangements
posed by anti-sharia laws).
233
See Fallon, supra note 55, at 181 (describing corrosive effect on American
culture bred by domestic anti-sharia movement’s stigmatization of Muslims).
234
See Joel A. Nichols, Multi-Tiered Marriage, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A
MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT 11, 11–15 (Joel A. Nichols, ed. 2012) (describing domestic
interplay between religious and state authority in domestic marriage regulation); see
also Robert D. Baird, Traditional Values, Governmental Values, and Religious Conflict in
Contemporary India, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 344 (1998) (“Both Hindus and Muslims
have traditionally held that family law was part of their religion and not a secular
matter.”).
235
See Volokh, supra note 13, at 435 (describing faith-based interests in estate
planning).
236
See id. at 436–37 (arguing that the “strong presumption in American law” for
the “freedom to dispose one’s property by will” should not vary based on religious
motivations).
237
See Mohammedi, supra note 61, at 264 (“[E]very single practicing Muslim must
ensure that his or her estate is distributed in a fashion dictated by Sharia law.”); Awad
v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1130 (10th Cir. 2012) (rejecting Oklahoma’s anti-sharia law
based on lack of “actual problem”).
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system.238 In an “anti-sharia” regime, courts would second-guess both
the nature and substance of faith-based arbitration, contrary to the
global rule that private arbitration arrangements should be honored
as a matter of freedom of contract and disturbed only where there is
an abuse of authority or a violation of public policy.239 And where
foreign judgments are concerned, courts would similarly unduly
interfere with otherwise-valid rulings from competent jurisdictions,
both in violation of our long-standing tradition of comity (on which,
not incidentally, we rely for similar respect for our laws and judgments
abroad) and to the particular detriment of immigrant populations.240
To the extent problems arise in the enforcement of faith-based
contracts or foreign law or judgments—e.g., gender discrimination,
deprivation of civil rights, unconscionable contracts—those should of
course be addressed.241 But they in fact are being addressed, and in
ways that do not malign faith.242 Religious liberty does not always
trump.243 Rather, public policy, comity, conscionability, and even the
First Amendment itself, provide meaningful limits in the application
of private and foreign law, religious or otherwise.244 And where there

238

See Helfand, supra note 153, at 167 (“Thus, the existence of religious arbitration
tribunals—and the legal enforceability of their awards—significantly expands the
scope of religious liberty enjoyed by religious legal communities as they provide an
adjudicative forum that both embodies religious values and promotes religious
practices.”); see also Bambach, supra note 146, at 404 (observing that Muslim tribunals
are attractive because “they may be more aware of, and sensitive to, cultural or religious
practices that run counter to U.S. norms”).
239
See Bambach, supra note 146, at 401 (describing general rules of enforceability
for arbitration agreements, including those rooted in religion).
240
See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 55, at 155–57, 164–66 (describing comity implications
of anti-sharia laws on immigrant Muslim population).
241
See Lugo, supra note 27, at 79 (“Adoption of Islamic practices or Sharia law to
the result of institutional discrimination against women is in conflict with American
laws, constitutional protections, and public policy.”); Estin, supra note 60, at 601
(raising gender-based free-exercise and family-law concerns in the context of faithbased contracting for domestic-relations matters).
242
See Volokh, supra note 21, at 236 (“Existing choice of law rules contain many
tools that ensure American courts do not apply a foreign law that is sufficiently against
American public policy.”).
243
John Witte, Jr., The Future of Muslim Family Law in Western Democracies, in SHARI’A
IN THE WEST 279, 286 (R. Adhar & N. Aroney eds., 2010) (observing that “even though
religious freedom is cherished” in the West, it does not always trump).
244
See ASIFA QURAISHI-LANDES, INST. FOR SOC. POLICY & UNDERSTANDING, SHARIA AND
DIVERSITY: WHY SOME AMERICANS ARE MISSING THE POINT 16 (2013),
http://www.ispu.org/pdfs/ISPU_Report_ShariaDiversity_Final_web.pdf (describing
common-law limits on domestic application of sharia); Fallon, supra note 55, at 180
(observing that “[t]he First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
protect against the application of religious law to a party who has not agreed to such
application”).
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are intangible social pressures that lie behind faith-based or foreign
arrangements but which fall short of disqualifying duress, these are not
unique to Muslims and are better suited to neutral and targeted
reforms rather than global limits on religious liberty.245
For some, the courts’ conception of current limits on religious or
foreign law is inadequate; “anti-sharia” advocates, for example, have
argued public policy is too malleable a concept to be trusted.246 But
insisting in non-specific terms, as many “anti-sharia” laws invariably do,
that courts must apply foreign or religious law in a manner consistent
with domestic law, hardly removes the risk of court error.247 And in any
event, if, as domestic sharia critics have argued, Islamic law is truly a
“dreadful disease” or a “mortal threat” to America,248 it is difficult to
imagine any examples fitting that bill which could overcome existing
constitutional, policy, or legal barriers to enforcement. That activists
can produce only a handful of cases where sharia has been applied in
a controversial way illustrates the point.249
Some also have argued that, unlike other faiths, Islam is different
because, they submit, it espouses an approach that is ultimately
inconsistent with Western democracy, or perhaps even with the
principle of religious freedom itself.250 But no matter the theoretical
or political merits of this argument, our domestic civil-rights regime
has never been reserved to those who fully agree with it. As Professor
245

See Bambach, supra note 146, at 413–14 (flagging issue of social pressure to enter
into faith-based contracts, particularly among women in minority-faith traditions, but
arguing such pressure is not an issue unique to Muslims and that overestimating it
might undercut the freedom women themselves should have to practice their faith);
see also Volokh, supra note 13, at 435 (describing pressure to conform as a common
factor in other faith communities).
246
See Lugo, supra note 27, at 67 (decrying as “soft” the public-policy limit on the
domestic use of sharia); Kelley, supra note 27, at 630 (calling existing limits on sharia
“woefully inadequate”).
247
See Volokh, supra note 21, at 243 (observing that the recent wave of foreign-law
statutes do not eliminate the risk of that courts will get domestic law wrong in applying
them).
248
See Gabbay, supra note 162 (quoting Florida lawmaker describing sharia as a
“dreadful disease”); Scott Shane, In Islamic Law, Gingrich Sees a Mortal Threat to U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2011, at A22 (quoting then-presidential candidate Newt Gingrich
describing sharia as a “mortal threat” to the United States).
249
See Franck, supra note 182 (observing, sarcastically, that critics of sharia in
America could only point to a “whopping” seven cases in thirty-five years of even
arguable application).
250
See TONI JOHNSON & LAUREN VRIENS, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, ISLAM:
GOVERNING UNDER SHARIA (2013), http://www.cfr.org/religion/islam-governingunder-sharia/p8034 (“Whether democracy and Islam can coexist is a topic of heated
debate.”); Kelley, supra note 27, at 628–29 (framing anti-sharia measures as protection
against norms at odds with domestic views of liberty).
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Volokh observes in this context, “[n]either the freedom of speech nor
the freedom of religion is limited to people who believe in values that
are compatible with American constitutional guarantees,” nor are such
freedoms limited “to those who support religious freedom.”251
To conclude otherwise risks alienating our fellow citizens and,
some have suggested, could even threaten our stability as a nation.252
By passing these laws, states send a message that Muslims are outsiders
who should be met with suspicion and distrust.253 The net result is a
mutually-reinforcing divisiveness that only increases the obstacles
Muslims already face—particularly since September 2001—in seeking
to assimilate and be treated as full and equal citizens.254 As Professor
Breger has lamented, “Muslims everywhere worry (rightfully) whether
they have a place in the American mosaic.”255 Therefore, to avoid
further misunderstanding and intolerance, “American non-Muslims
would be well-advised to extend the same rights to their Muslim
counterparts that they themselves enjoy.”256
As new faiths have come to America’s shores or sprouted up from
its soil, mainstream society has consistently struggled to understand
and incorporate them. Their often-unfamiliar practices can fit
awkwardly within existing cultural and legal frameworks. And the
majority, confronted by these strange and seemingly threatening
practices, has often been quick to condemn and slow to accommodate.
But over time, religious liberty has ultimately prevailed. Indeed,
“America’s exceptionalism has always been its ability to transform
itself—economically, culturally and religiously.”257 As such, broad
respect for religious-accommodation requests “should be something of
251

Volokh, supra note 13, at 456–57.
See Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of CounterRadicalization, 64 STAN. L. REV. 125, 173–74 (2012) (framing domestic anti-sharia
movement in context of other counter-radicalization efforts that risk alienating
Muslim Americans from their country).
253
See Schmitz, supra note 25, at 2 (“[T]he anti-sharia movement’s implication that
all Muslims are radicals amplifies resentments and fuels hate by encouraging
Americans to view their neighbors with suspicion and distrust.”).
254
See Ali, supra note 20, at 1065–67 (arguing that domestic anti-sharia movement
is designed to make Muslims second-class citizens, either directly or throughout
intimidation and fear-mongering).
255
Marshall J. Breger, International Holocaust Remembrance Day: Bringing Imams to
Auschwitz, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 26, 2011), www.huffingtonpost.com/marshall-jbreger/imams-at-the-death-camps_b_814447.html; see also Gregory C. Sisk & Michael
Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence from the Federal
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which Americans are proud, not afraid.”258
In the colonial era, Baptists and Quakers were banished,
imprisoned, and attacked.259 In the mid to late nineteenth century,
Catholics and Mormons faced mob violence, the burning of churches,
and various forms of overt discrimination.260 And in the early to midtwentieth century, anti-Semitism was widespread and other religious
minorities like Jehovah’s Witnesses were derided and targeted.261
At each of these moments in our history, however, persecution
gave way to accommodation and respect—even if imperfect or
delayed.262 As Professor Witte notes, “[t]he current accommodations
made to the religious legal systems of Christians, Jews, First Peoples,
and others in the West were not born overnight. They came only after
decades, even centuries of sometimes hard and cruel experience, with
gradual adjustments and accommodations on both sides.”263
Hopefully, it will not be such a long and suffering road for Muslim
Americans.264
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religion”).
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Anti-Religion Laws, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 273, 302 (2012) (“Religious persecution
is not a new phenomenon in America, and history suggests that the passage of time
generally leads to acceptance.”).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Like most matters we handle in our clinic at Stanford, the
application of sharia in domestic law chiefly concerns the ability to
practice one’s faith, not the merits of the practice chosen. Political
conservatives and liberals, believers of all stripes, and those with no
religious beliefs at all should appreciate this crucial and unifying
distinction—whether the religious practice involves liturgical worship,
grooming or clothing, marriage and family, or voluntary adherence to
sharia. And although religious liberty is not without its limits, those
limits should be imposed based on legitimate countervailing concerns
and under the established, non-discriminatory structures already
developed to address any such concerns.
In seeking to restrict further the domestic application of sharia by
those who strive to obey its precepts as they understand them, many
states have, purposefully or not, committed an all-too-common error
in the development of religious pluralism in this country. Like those
opposed to the practices of other faiths in earlier generations, today’s
“anti-sharia” activists may be able to point to controversial ways in
which sharia has been applied elsewhere or practiced as a purely
religious matter. But they ignore how it is in fact applied in American
courts—i.e., in accordance with established conflicts rules and the First
Amendment. The hype does not match the reality.
Whether framed in sharia, religious-law, or foreign-law terms,
legislation restricting the religious liberty of Muslim Americans has
been passed or proposed in almost two-thirds of the states. And
although it is practices sacred to many Muslims that are most at risk—
including those central to their families, communities, and identities—
all are threatened by the assault. Something is amiss where, as here, a
majority can restrict the religious liberty of a minority with neither
factual nor legal support to justify their actions. By pointing out these
errors and reminding the majority of the universal nature of that
liberty, the tide can, and must, turn.

